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1 Associate Professor, Columbia Law School.  Particular thanks to Henry Monaghan, Sam
Bagenstos, and Richard Primus for their generous and insightful comments, and to Ella Campi for
her helpful research assistance.
2 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
3 Lane, 124 S. Ct., at 1986 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997));
accord, Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).  While the Court
applied a congruence-and-proportionality inquiry in Boerne, the first of its recent section five
decisions, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, 530, 533, whether this inquiry represented a new
governing standard for section five challenges and what it entailed in practice were unclear.   See
Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev.
1127, 1147 (2000) (noting it was unclear from Boerne whether congruence-and-proportionality
signaled a shift in means-ends analysis under section five); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
Yale L. J. 441, 458 (2000) (describing ambiguities of congruence-and-proportionality test set out
in Boerne) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection].
4 124 S. Ct. at 1988, 1992.  As the Court’s recent decisions on the scope of section five
have arisen in the context of states claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity to private damage
actions, the Court often identifies an even prior step, namely determining “whether Congress
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity,” id. at 1985, an investigation not
unique to the section five context, see Atascadero State. Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43
(1985).
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ESSAY:  
FACIAL CHALLENGES AND FEDERALISM
Gillian E. Metzger1




Tennessee v. Lane2 is the latest installment in the Supreme Court’s recent,
bourgeoning jurisprudence on section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.  These
numerous decisions have helped clarify some of the features of the Court’s section
five analysis.  We now know that section five “legislation is valid if it exhibits ‘a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.’”3  More specifically, the Court has provided greater
guidance on how such determinations are to be made.  The Court first “identif[ies]
the constitutional right . . . that Congress sought to enforce,” and assesses whether
that right is “an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.”4  A crucial part of
this inquiry is the Court’s determination of whether Congress acted in light of
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5 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729; see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988-93 (identifying evidence of a
“pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice” and “pattern of disability
discrimination” against which Congress enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act).  
6 Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-40 (describing features of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)’s family-care leave provision that led the Court to find this
remedy was appropriately tailored to the targeted violation).
7 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36 (arguing that the presence of a heightened standard of
scrutiny made it “easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations”); see also
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (underscoring that Title II of the ADA aimed not only at remedying
disability discrimination, which is subject only to rationality review, but “also seeks to enforce a
variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more
searching judicial review”).  On the importance of standard of review to the scope of Congress’
enforcement power, see Samuel Bagenstos, __; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 Yale. L. J. 1943, 1964-71 (2003)[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism].
8 See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93.
9 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36.
10 See, e.g. Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimmel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); see also Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988 (distinguishing Garrett on this
basis); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36 (distinguishing Garrett and Kimmel on this basis).
11 Compare Bagenstos, supra note 6, with Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism,
supra note 6, at 1974-80 (arguing that how the Court applies the congruence-and-proportionality
“evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations on the part of the States.”5  If so,
the Court then determines whether the legislation  “is an appropriate response to
th[e] history and pattern of unequal treatment” found to exist regarding the
constitutional right at issue.6
Most notably, the Court’s decisions increasingly suggest that the key to
whether section five legislation will be upheld as congruent and proportional is the
standard of judicial review applicable to the underlying constitutional right itself.
Legislation seeking to vindicate rights that trigger only rationality review if sued on
directly is likely to exceed Congress’ section five powers; by contrast, legislation
aimed at securing rights receiving heightened scrutiny has a far greater chance of
judicial sustainment.7  In Lane, for example, a five-to-four majority upheld Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits public entities from
denying disabled individuals participation in or benefits of public services, programs,
or activities.  In so ruling, the Court stressed that Title II “is aimed at the
enforcement of a variety of basic rights, including the right to access to the courts,”
right that trigger at least intermediate and sometimes strict scrutiny.8   Similarly, in
the prior Term, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, upheld the family
leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), a provision which
grants members of both sexes the right to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care
for a family member.  The Court emphasized that the gender discrimination targeted
by the legislation triggers intermediate scrutiny.9  On the other hand, the Court has
invalidated section five legislation where the underlying rights ostensibly trigger
only rationality review.  Both Lane and Hibbs underscored that distinction.10
That said, grounds certainly exist to question the extent the Court’s
consistency in its section five decisions.11  One salient uncertainty is the nature of the
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inquiry depends on its sympathy for Congress’ substantive agenda), and Samuel Estreicher &
Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Antidiscrimination Law,
2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 109,153 (2001) (“[T]he test provides scant guidance for either Congress or the
lower courts as to the degree of congruence and proportionality required between legislative ends
and means.”).
12 Compare Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989-91(detailing evidence of “unconstitutional treatment
in state services and programs, including “the administration of justice”) with id. at 1999-2002
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional right of access to the courts does not
include the “right to make [a person’s] way into a courtroom without any assistance, but only
guarantees access to court proceedings, and that there was a “near-total lack of actual
constitutional violations in the constitutional record”); compare Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-34
(detailing evidence of state gender discrimination in employment) with id at 745–46, 749
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court “sets the contours of the inquiry at too high a
level of abstraction” and that the real question was “whether, notwithstanding the passage of Title
VII and similar state legislation, the States continued to engage in widespread discrimination in the
provision of family leave benefits”).
13 See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2000, 2001 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence
of judicial decisions fails to establish that Congress was responding to an identified pattern of
unconstitutional state action and discounting evidence submitted to a congressional task force for
similar reasons); but see Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729, 733-34 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (relying on judicial
decisions chronicling state gender discrimination in employment and examination of state family
leave policies in concluding that sufficient record of state gender discrimination in the
administration of leave benefits existed to justify a congressional remedy).
14 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 746-49 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence of
gender discrimination in leave policies by the private sector and federal government, and by the
states regarding parental leave, failed to justify the conclusion that the states had engaged in
gender discrimination regarding family leave policies); see also id. at 742-44 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a state can only be subject to section five legislation if it is shown that the
state itself engaged in unconstitutional action; a pattern of such action by other states does not
suffice); Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2010-13 (Scalia, J.) (arguing that prophylactic measures under section
five should only be upheld when used to prevent or remedy state racial discrimination).
15 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735; Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992 (maintaining that the “dissent’s
contention that the record is insufficient to justify [Title II] . . . is puzzling, to say the least,” as
Hibbs sustained the FMLA based on evidence “little of which concerned unconstitutional state
conduct” and the record of constitutional violations in Lane “far exceeds the record in Hibbs”) and
record of unconstitutional behavior by states that is needed before congressional
remedial action is constitutionally warranted.  Continuing disagreement on this front
surfaced rather sharply in Lane (and Hibbs) with respect to how precisely the
constitutional rights at issue must be identified.  Quite clearly, the more specific the
Court is identifying the unconstitutional behavior targeted by Congress, the more
difficult it will be to establish the necessary pattern of unconstitutional state action.12
This uncertainty is also evident in disputes regarding the type of evidence that the
Court can properly consider in assessing whether the requisite pattern exists — for
example, the relevance of judicial decisions identifying unconstitutional action as
opposed to congressional findings,13 as well as the legitimacy of congressional
extrapolations from evidence of private entities’ actions.14   Indeed, one of the more
amusing aspects of Lane was the Court’s emphasis on the paucity of evidence of
unconstitutional gender discrimination underlying the FMLA — this coming just one
year after all five of the Justices in the Lane majority signed onto the opinion in
Hibbs describing this evidence as sufficient to sustain that act’s constitutionality.15
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id. at 1991 n. 16 (agreeing with the characterization offered by Justice Kennedy’s Hibbs dissent
that most of the evidence of gender discrimination in the legislative record supporting the FMLA
involved gender discrimination by private employers, not by states).
16 Even accepting the claim that the underlying level of scrutiny is the linchpin to
assessing Congress’ powers under section five, some section five decisions remain hard to justify. 
United States v. Morrison, like Hibbs, involved gender discrimination; moreover, the Court
acknowledged that Congress had compiled a “voluminous” record demonstrating multiple
instances of unconstitutional state discrimination in addressing charges of gender-related violence. 
See 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000).  Yet the Court nonetheless ruled the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) provision at issue in Morrison unconstitutional because the means Congress used to
remedy this discrimination was suits against private rather than public actors, without in any way
deferring to Congress’ view that such suits against private actors was necessary to remedy public
discrimination.  See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 475-81 (emphasizing the
remedial nature of the VAWA and criticizing the result in Morrison as unjustified); see also
Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 10, at 141-58 (arguing that Morrison deviates from other recent
section five decisions by applying the congruence-and-proportionality test even where it was clear
Congress was motivated by legitimate remedial concerns).  Meanwhile, the characterization of the
level of scrutiny applicable to claims of disability discrimination as simply rationality review is
belied by the Court’s actual analysis in Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1995).  True, the Court’s stated of review there was rationality review, see id. at 446-47, but
the level of scrutiny it applied was a far cry from the deferential rationality review of Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 343 (1955).  See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50; id. at 458-60 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s refusal to apply one step at a time rule or acknowledge
legitimacy of city’s property values concerns were incompatible with ordinary rationality review).
Of course, whether degree of scrutiny offers a cogent descriptive account for the Court’s
recent section five decisions, the question still remains whether it should.  See Board of Trustees v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382-85 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no reason to
require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant to the exercise of its s. 5 authority, to adopt
rules or presumptions that reflect a court’s institutional limitations.”); see also Michael W.
McConnell, Comment— Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 153 181-94 (1997) (offering historical and institutional arguments against using
judicial decisions as measure of Congress’ section five power); see generally Post & Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 6.
17 124 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
18 Id. at 1993.
Such noticeably short-term turn-arounds do little to dispel the impression that the
Court’s section five jurisprudence is essentially results-driven.16 
The dispute between the majority and dissent in Lane, however, goes beyond
disagreement on what evidence satisfies the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry
in a specific case.  Instead, it centers on the general form section five analysis should
take, more specifically whether a court should assess the constitutionality of section
five legislation on a facial or as-applied basis.  Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, insisted that appropriate approach was as-applied, and he rejected the
petitioner’s invitation to “examine the broad range of Title II’s applications all at
once.”17  For him, the only question before the Court was “whether Congress has the
power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts” through
Title II of the ADA, not whether Title II was constitutional in all its potential
applications.18  Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, insisted that an as-applied
approach was inappropriate.  In his view, the purpose of “the congruence-and-
proportionality test . . . [is to determine] whether Congress has attempted to
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19 Id. at 2005.
20 Id.
21 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  Most recently, in United States v. Sabri, a decision this
Term rejecting a facial challenge to a spending statute, the Court did not invoke the Salerno
standard but agreed that “that facial challenges are best when infrequent,”and that facial
overbreadth challenges in particular “are especially to be discouraged.” 124 S. Ct. at 1948.  For a
discussion of the Salerno standard, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236-42 (1993); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary: As-
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1322-23
(2000) [hereinafter, Fallon, As-Applied.].
22 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 236; Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1323; Matthew
Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor
Fallon, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1371, 1390 (2000); but see Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth:
Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359, 395-421 (1998)
(arguing that the Salerno standard is not as inconsistent with Supreme Court practice as critics
claim).  For discussions of varying standards applied to facial challenges by Supreme Court
Justices, compare City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22 (1999) (Stevens, J.) (Salerno
is not the governing standard for facial challenges) with id., at 74-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that Salerno is the appropriate standard).
23 See, e.g., Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948 (identifying free speech contexts as one area where
facial challenges are accepted).  What is traditionally referred to as overbreadth doctrine refers to
the ability of a litigant to claim that a statute is unconstitutional even though it could be
constitutionally applied to her, because it prohibits a substantial amount of other constitutionally
protected conduct.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-119 (2003).  In addition to
overbreadth, the Court has also been receptive to other types of First Amendment facial
challenges, such as those alleging vagueness, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52
(1999) (plurality opinion), and delegation of standardless discretionary power, City of Lakewood v.
Plain Dealer Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-62 (1988).
statutorily redefine the constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”19 Considering Title II only as applied to the narrow issue of access to
state courts served “to rig the congruence-and-proportionality test by artificially
constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a recognized constitutional
right.”20  Hence, he maintained that determining whether Title II represents
appropriate section five legislation required that the Court examine Title II as a
whole, in all its applications.
Whether the constitutionality of section five legislation should be assessed
on a facial or on an as-applied basis is the focus of this Essay.  The Supreme Court’s
oft-stated position that facial constitutional challenges are discouraged is voiced with
varying degrees of intensity.  The most extreme version is United States v. Salerno’s
well-known statement that a facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully” and that to succeed “the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”21  As several scholars and
even some Justices have noted, however, in practice the Court accepts facial
challenges far more frequently than its stated tests suggest.22  First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine is often cited as the prime example.23  But it is far from the only
one.  Michael Dorf has identified several other contexts where the courts regularly
apply facial analysis to constitutional challenges, including when litigants assert that
a statute is unconstitutionally underinclusive, was motivated by a forbidden purpose,
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24 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 271-76, 279-81; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth,
1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 4 (1981) (noting that overbreadth analysis should be applicable whenever
courts apply a heightened standard of review).  In the abortion context, for example, the reigning
standard for availability of facial challenges appears not to be Salerno’s no valid applications test,
but rather the same substantive standard applicable to challenge on the merits:  an abortion
regulation is invalid if it will create a substantial obstacle to access to previability abortions in a
“large fraction” of the cases where it is relevant.  See Steinberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930
(2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (setting out undue burden
standard as substantive standard for reviewing abortion regulations and invalidating husband
notification requirement under this standard); see also Tucson Women’s Ctr. v. Eden, 371 F.3d
1173, 1181 (9th Cir 2004) (holding substantive abortion standard governs availability of facial
challenges). 
25 See Matthew Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 125-32, 157 (1998).
26 See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1335-41.
27 This point is not limited to the context of facial challenges to statutes, but applies to any
facial challenge to a governing rule.  However, as the section five debate focuses on federal
legislation, the discussion here will refer only to statutes.   In addition, for the sake of readability
statute as used here includes challenges only to specific statutory provisions as well as challenges
to the statute as a whole.
28 See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 3.  Scholars generally agree that the valid rule
requirement is a basic constitutional principle.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 20, at 242-44, 246-59
(accepting the valid rule requirement and offering justification of the requirement based on
Marbury v. Madison’s theory of judicial review and resultant concept of the rule of law, as well as
the Supremacy Clause); Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1331-33 (arguing that the “valid rule
requirement is fundamental” and while “it is hard to identify direct judicial affirmations of the
valid rule requirement, though a doctrinal home could easily be found in the Due Process Clause”);
see also Isserles, supra note 21, at 389-95 (disagreeing with Monaghan’s characterization of
overbreadth challenges as personal challenges based on the valid rule requirement rather than
third-party challenges, but agreeing that valid rule challenges represent a basic category of facial
challenges).  
The most prominent attack on the valid rule requirement has come from Matthew Adler,
who argues that the valid rule requirement is not reflected in Supreme Court doctrine and wrongly
views constitutional rights as personal rights rather than as rights against rules.  See Adler, Rights,
Rules, supra note 21, at 1395-1406.  However, the conflict between Adler’s view and the valid
rule requirement appears more theoretical than real.  Adler acknowledges that courts may respond
to an invalid rule by either facial or partial invalidation.  See Matthew Adler, Rights Against Rules:
The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 125-32, 158 (1998).  If
or infringes on fundamental rights.24  Some scholars have taken the point even
further; Matthew Adler in particular has gone so far as to contend that all
constitutional challenges are in some sense facial challenges.25  Although arguing
that, on the contrary, all constitutional challenges “are in an important sense as-
applied,” Richard Fallon similarly concurs in the assessment that facial challenges
are much more frequent than the Court admits.26  
Existing scholarship also generally agrees that the debate regarding the
availability of facial challenges is really a debate about statutory severability, that is,
whether unconstitutional applications of a statute27 should be presumed severable or
nonseverable in a given context.  Severability’s centrality follows from the basic
(though rarely acknowledged) proposition that “a litigant always ha[s] the right to
be judged in accordance with a valid rule of law.”28  If unconstitutional applications
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a court invalidates the rule, then in keeping with the valid rule requirement, it will not be applied
to an individual; if on the other hand, a court responds by severing the rule’s unconstitutional
applications, the “amended” rule is valid and thus its application, even retrospectively, does not
necessarily violate the valid rule requirement.  See Adler, Rights, Rules, supra 21, at 1405; see
also Monaghan, Overbreadth, supra note 23, at 3, 8-10 (arguing that while a rule with
unconstitutional applications is invalid in regard to any litigant, it can be applied to those engaging
in unprotected conduct if it can narrowed to fit constitutional requirements.  In any event, Adler
agrees on the importance of severability to facial challenges.  See Adler, Rights Against Rules,
supra, at 158 (“[F]acial challenge doctrine . . . . is a doctrine that answers the question:  Where a
rule is constitutionally invalid, should the reviewing court repeal the invalid rule, or should the
court amend the rule in some way?”).
29 See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 6 n. 22, 8, 17 (noting fair warning and vagueness
concerns may still preclude application).
30 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 238, 250; Monaghan, supra note 23, at 5-7; Fallon, As-
Applied, supra note 20, at 1333.
31 See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948-49; see also id., at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(refusing to join the part of the Court’s opinion disapproving of facial challenges but noting only
that the Court was not questioning the ability of litigants generally to challenge legislation as
outside of Congress’ constitutional powers).
32 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
are not severed, the statute cannot be applied to any litigant, even one making no
claim of constitutional protection for her conduct.  On the other hand, if
unconstitutional applications of a statute can be severed, no reason exists to refuse
to apply the statute to conduct that is not constitutionally protected becomes
unjustified.29  Viewed through the lens of the valid rule requirement, therefore, the
Court’s reluctance to entertain facial challenges is justifiable only if seen as
embodying a presumption of severability — in the case of Salerno, as Michael Dorf
has argued, a nearly irrebutable presumption.30 
Lane thus presents an opportunity to consider what the rule should be on
facial challenges and severability in section five context, as well as regarding
federalism-based challenges more generally.   Interestingly, in United States v. Sabri,
an opinion issued on the same day as Lane, the Court also expressly rejected a facial
challenge to spending clause legislation, but did so with far less fanfare.31   More
surprisingly still, Sabri referred to section five as an area where facial overbreadth
challenges are appropriate.  Adding to the confusion is that many of the Court’s
recent section five decisions appear (at least at first glance) to invalidate the statutes
there challenged on facial grounds, as do two recent commerce clause decisions,
United States v. Lopez32 and United States v. Morrison.33   This raises the question
of not just of how the Court should approach section five challenges, but further
whether distinct procedural rules should govern different in congressional power
contexts, and if so, why?
This Essay begins by reviewing the Court’s precedent involving claims that
statutes exceed Congress’ enumerated powers to determine how the Court thus far
has approached the question of facial challenges and severability in that context. 
The dominant theme to emerge from this review is that of inconsistency.  What
equally becomes apparent is the confusion spawned by the Court’s narrow definition
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of facial challenges Salerno-style as only available where the statute has no valid
applications and thus  resulting in total invalidation of a statute.  This definition
obscures both the range of forms a facial challenge can take and the important role
severability plays in the Court’s treatment of facial challenges.  Notably, a close
examination of the Court’s recent section five and commerce clause precedent
demonstrates that notwithstanding their facial tone, the Court in fact is not deviating
from ordinary severability rules in these decisions.
The Essay then turns to assessing whether, precedent aside, a doctrine of
nonseverability should govern in the section five context, and answers this question
in the negative.   While section five statutes should not be immune from facial attack,
in assessing the merits of such challenges no reason exists to diverge from the
ordinary rule that federal courts will presume unconstitutional applications of federal
statutes are severable.  The substantive content of the congruence-and-
proportionality test, viewed simply as requiring narrow means-ends tailoring or as
a search for illicit purpose, does not require formulation of a special nonseverability
doctrine, nor does such a doctrine follow from the general nature of challenges to
congressional power.  Instrumental arguments for severability — such as ensuring
that states not be chilled from asserting their constitutional prerogatives by the need
to engage in piecemeal litigation, that Congress takes federalism limits on its powers
seriously, and that the federal courts are protected from excessive and inappropriate
burdens — are equally unavailing to justify departure from settled severability
principles.  Indeed, an analysis of these arguments demonstrates that a
nonseverability presumption and concomitant insistence on assessing the
constitutionality of a section five statute based on all its applications would represent
a greater move to judicial supremacy in this area, than even the Court’s recent
section five decisions appear to countenance.  The Essay concludes with
consideration of whether federalism concerns justify a departure from ordinary
practice in other congressional power contexts.
I.     CONGRESSIONAL POWER CASES AND THE MEANING
 OF FACIAL CHALLENGES
Before turning to the normative question of whether the Court should treat
section five challenges on a facial or an as-applied basis, the Court’s prior practice
in cases involving claims that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers warrants
careful analysis.  The variation in the Court’s section five jurisprudence in recent
years — both compared to earlier decisions that did not use the congruence-and-
proportionality test and in the application of this test — might seem to call into
question the utility of such an inquiry.  Nonetheless, important points emerge.  One
is that the facial tone of recent section five decisions is misleading, and in fact the
Court has no consistent practice regarding whether challenges to Congress’ powers
are addressed on a facial on as-applied basis.  A second is the extent to which, in the
recent section five decisions and congressional power challenges generally, the Court
either presumed ordinary severability rules apply, or in fact severed unconstitutional
applications of challenged statutes.  Examination of these decisions also
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34 See 124 S. Ct. at 1992 n. 18; 2005; see also Sabri v. United States, 124 U.S. 1941, 1948
(2004) (noting that the Court had “recognized the validity of facial attacks” in suits addressing
“legislation under [section] five of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Catherine Carroll, Note, Section
Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1026, 1034-04 (2003).
35  See also Sabri, 124 U.S. at 1948(identifying Boerne as a facial challenge). 
36 See 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997).
37 Id. at 511, 530-36.
38 See Employment Div’n. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 884-85 (1990). 
39 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 537
(1993).
40 Id. at 511-12.  According to Douglas Laycock, counsel for respondent Archbishop
demonstrates the need for greater clarity about what constitutes a facial challenge
and the importance of underlying substantive constitutional law in determining
whether such a challenge used and when severability is appropriate.
A. Section Five and Enforcement Power Precedent
1.  Recent Section Five Precedent.  Since City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997,
the Court has issued several decisions on the scope of Congress’ section five powers.
Yet until Lane, a majority of the Court never expressly addressed the question of
whether facial challenges are appropriate in that context.  At first inspection, it
appears the Court implicitly treated these recent decisions as Salerno-type facial
challenges; their tone and focus suggest the Court held the statutes at issue invalid
in all their applications.  Indeed, both the majority and dissent in Lane agreed with
this description.34  On closer review, however, such a characterization of the
decisions is difficult to sustain.
Boerne itself is a good example of the seemingly facial character of these
decisions.35  There, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits federal and state governments
from imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion unless they can
demonstrate the burden represents the least restrictive means of meeting a
compelling government interest.36  It held RFRA “exceed[ed] Congress’ power,”
underscoring both the breadth of the RFRA’s restrictions on the states and the
paucity of evidence of religious bigotry in the legislative record.37  According to the
Court, RFRA’s legislative history made clear that Congress’ goal was to statutorily
overturn the Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith, which held that
generally applicable legislation that only incidentally burdens religion, as opposed
to laws that direct target religion or deny religious groups individuated assessment
granted to others, does not offend the Free Exercise Clause.38   True, theoretically
suit under RFRA remains available to target intentional religious discrimination or
denial of individualized treatment, claims that trigger strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause.39   The Court did not expressly address applicability of RFRA in
such situations, and its brief description of the underlying facts suggests that it did
not view the case as an instance of government singling out a religious entity for
harsh treatment.40  But this reading of Boerne is at odds with the Court’s apparent
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Flores, evidence of selective discriminatory treatment did exist, but was not included in the record,
because the parties agreed to proceed with the case a facial challenge to RFRA’s constitutionality. 
See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743,
775-71 (1997).
41 One reason why the Court may have failed to address whether intentional
discrimination and denial of individualized treatment claims remain available under RFRA is that
RFRA adds nothing in these contexts; individuals could assert such claims in section 1983 suits or
as defenses against state enforcement action and receive the same substantive protection. 
Congress itself was more concerned about providing protection against generally applicable laws
that burden religious exercise, as demonstrated by its enactment of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2004), after Boerne.  See Midrash Sephardi,
Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004).
42 527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43 527 U.S. at 643-45.
44 Id. at 644 n.9.
45 Id. at 640, 646.
46 Id. at 653-54; see also Fallon, As Applied, supra note 20, at 1356-59 (discussing
Florida Prepaid)..
lack of concern with Boerne’s underlying facts, and its focus instead on the
legislative record and scope of RFRA’s remedy.41 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank also has a decidedly facial cast.  Florida Prepaid considered whether
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy
Act), which abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for patent
infringements, exceeded Congress’ section five powers.42   According to the
majority, a state violates patent holders’ due process rights only when it “provides
no remedy, or only inadequate remedies,” for intentional or reckless patent
infringement.43  As a result, in order to assess whether the Patent Remedy Act was
constitutional as applied to the case at hand, the Court would need to determine
whether Florida’s remedies for patent infringement were constitutionally adequate.
But although the majority noted that Florida provided remedies for patent
infringement in a footnote, it never undertook to assess their adequacy.44  Instead, it
emphasized that Congress failed to identify a “pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violation,” and had done “nothing to limit
the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations.”45  The
facial character of Florida Prepaid is reinforced by Justice Stevens’ criticism in
dissent, joined by three other Justices, that the majority’s opinion had “nothing to do
with the facts of this case.”  Justice Stevens argued that the Court should address
only the question whether the Patent Act was constitutional as “applied to willful
infringement,” because the case emerged out of such a charge.46  Although the
majority never directly responded to this contention, its statement “that the Patent
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47 527 U.S. at 647; see also id., at 630 (same); id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As I
read the Court’s opinion, its negative answer to the question [of whether the Patent Remedy Act
was within Congress’ section five powers] has nothing to do with the facts of this case.”); see also
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing Court in Florida Prepaid did not
leave open that the Patent Remedy Act might be constitutional as applied to “intentional
uncompensated patent violations”).
48 A similar facial cast is evident in other recent section five decisions.  In considering
Title I of the ADA in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) and the Age
Discrimination Act (ADEA) in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Court
noted that irrational discrimination by state employers on the basis of age or disability was
unconstitutional.  But again, the Court did not examine whether the alleged discrimination in those
cases was irrational, nor expressly limit its holdings that the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity in these two statutes exceeded Congress’ section five powers to instances of rational
discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360, 366-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84, 91; see also Lane,
124 S. Ct. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that if Court had used an as-applied
approach in Garrett, “Title I might have been upheld ‘as applied’ to irrational employment
discrimination”).      Instead, the Court emphasized other types of remedies available to state
employees subject to age or disability discrimination.  See 528 U.S. at 91-92 (noting most state
employees can recover money damages for age discrimination under state age discrimination
statutes); 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (noting remedies of injunctive relief and suits for money damages by
the United States still remained available under Title I of the ADA).
49 See 538 U.S. 721, 733-34 (2003); see also id. at 755 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(describing Nevada’s leave policies).
50 See 538 U.S. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 724 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 However, Justice Stevens’ attempt to distinguish this precedent in Lane is not
particularly persuasive.  He argued that “all [the] . . . recent [section] five cases[] concerned
legislation that narrowly targeted the enforcement of a single constitutional right,”  124 S. Ct.
1978, 1993 n. 18 (2004).  This characterization of the Court’s prior section five jurisprudence
elides important distinctions under the rubric of “single constitutional right.”  Congress enacted
RFRA, for example, to enforce individuals’ free exercise rights, but as noted the scope of the free
exercise right varies significantly depending upon whether the government is simply subjecting
Remedy Act cannot be sustained under [section] five”47 is more in keeping with an
across-the-board assessment of that act’s constitutionality.48
Nor is the seemingly facial character of these decisions limited to those
invalidating section five legislation.  Hibbs, which upheld the family leave provision
of the FMLA, arose out of a suit against a department of the Nevada state
government.  Yet the majority nowhere examines Nevada’s leave provisions for state
employees prior to the FMLA’s enactment, even though it describes the types of
leave available in other states.49  Moreover, writing for himself in dissent, Justice
Scalia stated that unlike instances where legislation is challenged as violating
individual constitutional rights, in congressional power challenges “the court first
asks whether the statute is constitutional on its face,” and then assesses whether the
statute is also constitutional as applied if the facial challenge fails.50  The Court did
not leave room for such an as-applied challenge, however, stating “[w]e hold that
employees of the State of Nevada may recover money damages in the event of the
State’s failure to comply with the family-care provisions of the [FMLA].”51
On the other hand, it would be wrong to view these decisions as clearly
upholding the use of facial challenges in section five litigation.52  To begin with, the
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religion to generally applicable laws or instead targeting it for special burdens.  See supra note 39. 
To the extent that Boerne’s language suggests that RFRA was invalid even with respect to the
latter type of government action, it seems quite irrelevant that the constitutional protections against
intentional religious discrimination and generally applicable legislation emanate from the same
constitutional source.  Moreover, it appears the plaintiffs suing under the section five legislation
addressed in these decisions might have been able to allege violations of other constitutional
rights.  For example, one of the plaintiffs in Lane was a disabled court stenographer who was
prevented from obtaining employment in Tennessee courthouses because they were not handicap
accessible.  See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83.  If she can make a claim for removal of the barriers
under Title II of the ADA on the basis of her constitutional right of access to the courts, why can
she not also make a claim on this basis under Title I, which protects against disability
discrimination in employment?  The judicial background and legislative record that the Court cites
in upholding Title II, see id. at 1989-91, also applied to Title I.
53 See, e.g., 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (stating it would be rational and thus constitutional
for a state to refuse to make any accommodation for the disabled); see also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 87-88 (2000) (concluding that “very little” of the conduct prohibited by the
ADEA is likely to be unconstitutional and noting that age can be used as a proxy for other
characteristics).
54 See 538 U.S. 721, 741-42 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The constitutional violation
that is a prerequisite to "prophylactic" congressional action to ‘enforce’ the Fourteenth
Amendment is a violation by the State against which the enforcement action is taken.  There is no
guilt by association.”).
55 See id. at 727-28 ("'Congress’ power ‘to enforce’ the Amendment includes the authority
both to remedy and to deter violation of rights . . . . In other words, Congress may enact so-called
prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and
Court never expressly addressed the question and thus never provided a justification
as to why the ordinary rules disfavoring facial challenges should not apply here.
What the decisions most clearly reveal is the Court’s belief that the state actions
targeted by congressional legislation in most of these cases — imposing general
burdens on religion, patent infringement, or age and disability discrimination — will
rarely be unconstitutional.  This lack of sympathy for the alleged underlying
constitutional challenges translates into the broad tenor of these decisions; part of the
explanation for the Court’s refusal to leave open application of Title I of the ADA
to irrational age and disability discrimination in Board of Trustees v. Garrett is no
doubt that it believed such discrimination will almost, if not always, be rational.53
In these decisions, the Court was focused on substance and not procedure, and thus
discerning a view on the appropriateness of facial challenges requires some reading
between the lines.  
This is true even of Florida Prepaid and Hibbs, where the dissents’ seeming
arguments for an as-applied approach might suggest that the facial tone of the
majority opinions was intended.  In fact, however, the dissents’ arguments are less
supportive of an as-applied than might at first appear.  In particular, underlying
Justice Scalia’s view in Hibbs that Nevada must retain the ability to raise an as-
applied challenge is his belief that a state could not be subjected to the FMLA absent
evidence that particular state engaged in discrimination.54  It was this substantive
constitutional rule that the majority rejected, holding that a sufficient pattern of
gender discrimination by states generally was sufficient to justify subjecting a
particular state, Nevada, to the act.55  While Justice Stevens’ comments in Florida
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deter unconstitutional conduct.”) (internal quotations omitted).
56 See 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988 (2004) (noting in passing only that right of access to the
court grants “a criminal defendant such as respondent Lane the right to be present at all stages of
the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings”) (internal quotations
omitted); see also id. at 200 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (providing brief argument as to why
no rights of access to the court were violated in the case before the court).
57 Compare, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 173, 183-84 (1983) (holding
statute prohibiting display of signs, banners, or devices in the “Supreme Court building and on its
grounds” unconstitutional only as applied to public sidewalks surrounding the Court), with United
States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp’ees U., 513 U.S. 454, 477-79 & n.26 (1995) (enjoining enforcement
of broad honoria ban covering all federal employees only as applied to executive branch
employees below grade GS-16 but refusing to only enjoin enforcement insofar as employees’
speech did not bear a nexus to the employees’ job, holding that imposing a nexus requirement not
in the statute would represent a “serious invasion of the legislative domain”), with Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, (1992) (refusing to sever potential constitutional application of
Oklahoma statute notwithstanding statute’s severability clause which under state law created a
presumption of severability, because severability clause authorized severing “any part or provision
. . . held void,” and did not refer to severing unconstitutional applications).  For a discussion of the
Court’s inconsistency regarding severability in the period after the civil war through the early New
Deal, see generally Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court,
51 Harv. l. Rev. 76 (1937).
Prepaid are more procedural in focus, it is notable that he did not suggest that the
Court limit itself to assessing whether the Patent Remedy Act was constitutional in
regard to wilful patent infringements by Florida alone, but rather wilful
infringements generally.  As a result, even in Justice Stevens’ terms, the challenge
to the Patent Remedy Act went beyond the factual situation of the case at hand.  This
is also true of Lane itself.  Although the majority there refused to consider the
constitutionality of Title II as applied to constitutional rights other than access to the
courts, it did not limit itself to assessing the constitutionality of Title II as applied to
the situations of the two plaintiffs in the case — indeed, it never seriously assessed
whether their rights of access to the courts were actually violated.56
In sum, in all these decisions — Lane, Hibbs, and Florida Prepaid included
— both the majority and the dissents agree that assessing the constitutionality of
section five legislation requires going beyond the specifics of the case before the
Court.   The reason for this agreement is not difficult to discern.  If the
constitutionality of a section five statute turns on whether a pattern of
unconstitutional action exists in the states as a whole, then the Court must necessarily
look beyond the actions of the state in the case before it in assessing the claim that
the statute exceeds Congress’ powers.  Hence again, the facial tone of these decisions
is really a reflection of their substantive analysis, rather than a position on whether
the Court should assess the constitutionality of a challenged statute based on all its
possible applications.
A second reason why these decisions are less supportive of a facial approach
than they initially appear concerns severability.  The standard rules governing
severability are fairly well established, although the Court has not always applied
these rules consistently.57  Courts ordinarily apply a presumption of severability and
sever any unconstitutional provisions or applications of a statute rather than hold it
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58 See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-03
(1985); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).  Although the Court has not expressly
adopted such a presumption, it lies implicit in the Court’s approach to severability and facial
challenges.  See infra text accompanying note 30; John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L.
Rev. 210, 218-25 (1994); see also Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 234
(1932) (“Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provision which are
within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left
is fully operative as a law.”).
59 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997).  Such susceptibility may turn on the
availability of a “clear line” supported by statutory text or legislative intent that the Court could
use to trim a statute to constitutional confines.   Id.; see also  Morales, 547 U.S. at 55 (plurality
opinion) (severability impossible where “vagueness permeates the text of [a criminal] law”).  It is
also dependent on the substantive constitutional requirements that a statute must meet.  See infra
notes 119, 136 and accompanying text.
60See Richard H. Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal
System 182-84 (5th ed. 2003) (describing severability doctrine as applied to federal statutes)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler]; Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1987) (setting out
rules governing severability of federal statutes).  In regard to state statutes, severability is a
question of state law; while the federal courts also apply a presumption of severability and focus
on legislative intent if no authoritative state construction exists, rulings on severability by a state’s
highest court are binding.  See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 56, at 182-84 (describing presumption
of severability regarding state statutes implicit in Yazoo & Mississippi R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912)); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam) (noting
whether provisions in state statute are severable is question of state law).
61 See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 US 947, 965-66 & n. 13 (1984)
(upholding facial challenge where “there is no core of easily identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable conduct that the statute prohibits” and noting state court was unable to construe
statute to address constitutional problems); Monaghan, supra note 23, at 10-12. 
62 See Garrett, 521 U.S. at 360 n. 1 (refusing to address the constitutionality of Title II of
the ADA); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n.5 (noting that the federal
appellate courts had uniformly upheld the constitutionality of a separate provision of the VAWA
that made it a federal crime to travel across state lines with the intent to injure, harass, or
intimidate that person’s spouse or intimate partner” and who thereby causes the spouse or partner
facially invalid; this approach comports with the principle that courts should avoid
unnecessarily holding statutes unconstitutional and deciding cases without full
factual development or adversarial presentation.58  On the other hand, a court will
“impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such
a construction.”59  Severability in regard to federal statutes is in large part a question
of congressional intent and functionality:  Would Congress have enacted the
remaining provisions without the severed portions, and can the remaining portions
function independently?60  But severability doctrine also contains a little noticed
judicial feature.  Legislative intent to the side, can the court formulate a satisfying
limiting principle to constrain the statute?  If not, severing unconstitutional
applications is not an option and the court will resort to full invalidation.61
The Court’s failure to sever potentially constitutional applications of the
challenged section five statutes might seem to signal a departure from these ordinary
severability rules.  In fact, however, the Court routinely presumed severability in
these cases.  This is clearest in Garrett, where the Court stated it was only addressing
the constitutionality of Title I, and not other parts of the ADA.62  More importantly,
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bodily injury).
63 531 U.S. at 374 n. 9. 
64 See 538 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the FMLA is “likely a valid
exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, and so the standards it prescribes will
be binding upon the states” and enforceable by private suits for injunctive relief or suits by the
Unites States for money damages) (citations omitted). 
65 See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-59 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding RFRA
constitutional as applied to federal government); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph’s Medical Ctr.,
192 F.3d 826, 831-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law);
Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F3d 854, 858-61 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).
66 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 959-60
(holding unconstitutional application of RFRA to the states is severable); Young, 141 F.3d at 858-
59 (same).  Congress has amended RFRA to only apply to federal law.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3a
(2004).
67 124 S. Ct. at 2005.
Garrett (like many of these decisions) addressed the constitutionality of making the
states liable for money damages in private suits; the Court stressed that the duties
imposed by Title I of the ADA remained binding and could be enforced by other
means, such as injunctive suits or suits for money damages brought by the United
States.63  Plainly, then, in Garrett the Court was implicitly ruling the private suit
remedy severable from Title I’s substantive duties.  Dissenting in Hibbs, Justice
Kennedy advocated a similar interpretation of the FMLA.64
Another example concerns subsequent judicial responses to Boerne.
Boerne’s language and analysis appear in keeping with a Salerno-style approach
holding the statute invalid in all its applications.  Notably, however, several federal
appellate courts have since upheld RFRA’s substantive requirements as applied to
federal law or the federal government and territories, even though invalid as applied
to the states.65  On the one hand, these rulings might appear perfectly unexceptional;
after all, the federal government relies on its Article I and other powers, not the
section five enforcement power, in regulating the federal government or the content
of federal law.  Yet the substantive duties RFRA imposes on state and federal
government come in the same statutory provision, and thus courts must find the
provision’s reference to state governments severable in order to find the provision
can still be applied to the federal government.66 Absent such severability, the
provision’s unconstitutionality in regard to state governments would render it
completely unenforceable. 
In Lane the Chief Justice Rehnquist seemingly sought to rebut the Court’s use
of severability in other section five decisions by characterizing Title II as an
“undifferentiated” statute that “applies indiscriminately to all services, programs, or
activities of any public entity.”67  The thrust of this characterization is unclear.  On
the one hand, his point might be that, unlike the other section five legislation the
Court considered, in the case of Title II no separate statutory text existed that the
Court could sever; instead, here the Court was resorting to severing applications of
a single statutory provision.  But the case law does not support drawing a strict
distinction between text severability and application severability.  The Court has
applied severability in both contexts, and in both its inquiry is the same: is
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68 See United States v. National Treasury Emp’ees U., 513 U.S. 454, 477-79 (1995); see
also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 173, 183-84 (1983) (invalidating statute prohibiting
display of signs, banners, or devices in the “Supreme Court building and on its grounds”only as
applied to public sidewalks surrounding the Court, even though provision made no separate
mention of sidewalks); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-06 (1985) (partially
invalidating state obscenity statute “only insofar as the word lust is taken to include normal interest
in sex” after determining that such partial invalidation accorded with state legislature’s intent).
69 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882-84 (1997) (severing constitutional portion
of statute that “enjoy[ed] a [separate] textual manifestation” but refusing to narrowly construe
remainder of statute to avoid unconstitutional applications because “open-ended character of the
[statute] provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage” in accordance with
congressional intent); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 460-61 (1992) (refusing to sever
potential constitutional application of state statute on grounds that doing so would transform the
statute into “a fundamentally difference piece of legislation” and emphasizing “it is clearly not this
Court’s role to rewrite a state statute”). 
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 12213 (2004).
71 See, e.g., cases cited supra in notes 72-73.  More commonly, the Court simply notes in
rejecting a facial challenge that an as-applied challenge might still lie.  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
Dist. Ct. provides a recent example.  There, the Court rejected the petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment challenges to a Nevada law requiring that individuals identify themselves when
stopped under a reasonable suspicion of having engaged in criminal activity.  See 2004 WL
1373207, at *6-*10 (June 21, 2004).  But the Court qualified its rejection of the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination claim by noting that “a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that
furnishing identity at the time of a stop” would be incriminating, and concluded — without
mentioning severability by name — that if so, “the court can then consider whether the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege applies.”  Id. at *10.
severability consistent with legislative intent?  For example, in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, the Court relied on its assessment of
congressional intent to enjoin a ban on receiving honoraria only as applied to lower-
level executive branch employees, notwithstanding that no such distinction among
types of employees was contained in the text of the statute.68   To the extent any
difference lies between these two severability contexts, it is simply that, applying
ordinary severability rules, the Court may be more likely to find that the legislature
intended statutory text to be severed, and that a court can craft a constitutional
construction without overstepping the judicial role, than in the various applications
of a single statutory term.69 
A second way of reading the Chief Justice’s point is simply as the claim that
Title II is not readily susceptible to having its different applications severed from one
another.  Perhaps so; it is certainly true that the majority offers no justification for
its contrary premise that Title II can be construed in this fashion, and reference to
severing applications is notably absent from the ADA’s severability clause.70  On the
other hand, the majority has substantial precedential company in this regard; the
Court in fact only infrequently addresses severability unless it finds a particular
provision or application unconstitutional.71  Moreover, given the presumption of
severability that lies behind the Court’s professed practice of addressing
constitutional challenges on an as-applied basis, the onus would appear to lie on the
Chief Justice to provide greater justification than simply characterizing Title II as
“undifferentiated” to explain why the majority errs in its construction of Title II.
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72 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
73 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
74 384 U.S. at 644-45 & n.3 (1966).  Also meriting mention, given Justice Stevens’
arguments in Lane, is that the Court limited its holding to being that section 4(e) was “a proper
exercise of the powers granted to Congress by [section five] of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and
refused to assess whether section 4(e) would be constitutional if assessed as an exercise of other
congressional powers.  See id. at 644 & n.4.
75 See 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960).  The district court’s approach was not without precedential
support.  In particular, in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (19875), the Court ruled that
Congress’ Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power authorized only federal legislation imposing
criminal penalties on elections officials for refusing to accept the votes of qualified electors on 
account of race or color.  As the statute before it contained no such state action limitation, the
Court ruled it could not be enforced — even when the conduct of state elections officials was
challenged precisely on this basis.  See id. at 218-22; see also id., at 241-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(noting that the defendant was prosecuted for denying the right to vote on account of race); see
also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136, 139-40 (1903) (refusing to apply a federal statute
prohibiting the use of bribery to deny a qualified voter the right to vote on account of race in a case
alleging bribery in federal elections).  Given the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines, however,
Reese offers little support for deviating from ordinary severability rules in the enforcement power
context today.  See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24 (suggesting Reese may have rested on
fair warning concerns but adding “to the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsistent with
Regardless, even if Title II should not be construed as severable, this would  not
justify applying a presumption against severability in other section five challenges.
2.  Earlier Enforcement Power Decisions.  So much for the Court’s recent
precedent.  But what about its earlier decisions addressing Congress’ section five
power:  Do they cast useful illumination on how the Court should approach
enforcement power challenges?  Once again, it is hard to discern a clear practice.
Notably, however, these earlier decisions are more as-applied in tone, and the Court
even more regularly engaged in severability.
Two enforcement power challenges decided expressly on an as-applied basis
are Katzenbach v. Morgan72 and United States v. Raines.73  In Katzenbach, the Court
considered a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that attacked
the section only insofar as it would enable New York residents who were educated
in Puerto Rico to vote, notwithstanding that they were unable to read and write
English as required by New York law.  The Court justified its decision to consider
the challenge on this limited basis on the ground that section 4(e) was adopted with
“the explicit purpose of dealing with the disenfranchisement of large segments of the
Puerto Rican population in New York,” and that “in all probability the practical
effect of [the section] will be limited to enfranchising those educated in Puerto Rican
schools.”74  Raines, a decision relied on by Justice Stevens in Lane, addressed the
facial versus as-applied question in far more detail and came down firmly on the as-
applied side.  In Raines, the federal government sought to enjoin Georgia voting
officials from preventing Blacks from registering to vote under a federal statute
passed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  The district court had dismissed the
government’s action on the ground that “the statute on its face was susceptible of
[unconstitutional] application,” namely application to private individuals, and thus
should be “considered unconstitutional in all its applications.”75  The Supreme Court
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what we think the better one . . ., we cannot follow it here”); GET see also Stern, supra note 56, at
94-106 (criticizing Reese and arguing that the Court deviated from its approach in subsequent
decisions).
76 362 U.S. at  24-25.
77 Id. at 22-24; see also Griffin v, Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) (stating “the
Court has long since firmly rejected” earlier use of “a severability rule that required invalidation of
an entire statute if any part of it was unconstitutionally overbroad, unless its different parts could
be read as wholly independent provisions”).
78 See 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883) (“It applies equally to cases arising in states which have the
justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to
enforce such laws as to those which arise in states that may have violated the prohibition of the
amendment.”)
79 See id. at 4-8.  In this regard, The Civil Rights Cases stands in contrast to United States
v. Guest, where the Court upheld federal indictments against private individuals for conspiracy to
deny Blacks access to places of public accommodation on the grounds that the indictments alleged
sufficient state involvement to qualify as targeting state action.  See 383 U.S. 745, 755-57 (1966);
see also id., at 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring).  Notably, however, the Court in Guest disagreed on
whether the federal statute in question applied to private action, and the Court’s emphasis on the
specific facts alleged in the indictment was as much a response to statutory authority concerns as
to concerns about whether, if read to encompass private action, the statute was constitutional. 
Compare id. at 755 (reading statute as simply replicating bare terms of the Equal Protection
Clause), with id. at 762-63 (Clark, J., concurring) (not addressing statutory question but stating
Congress can reach private action) with id. at 777-84 (Brennan, J.) (reading statute as covering
private action and arguing that the statute as so read was constitutional).
80 109 U.S. at 25.
81 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624-25 (2000).
reversed.  According to the Court, “if the complaint here called for an application of
the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should have
been an end to the question of constitutionality.”76  Significantly, the Court rejected
the suggestion it should deviate from its usual rules disfavoring facial challenges and
presuming severability in the congressional power context.77  
Some notable earlier enforcement power decisions initially appear more
facial, but like the recent section five decisions, their facial character becomes more
questionable on closer inspection.  In The Civil Rights Cases, for example, the Court
held, inter alia, that sections one and two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in places of public accommodation,
exceeded Congress’ powers under the Fourteenth Amendment because they were not
limited to targeting state action.  In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the 1875 act
was not limited to states that had violated Fourteenth Amendment rights,78 and did
not undertake a detailed inquiry into whether the states where the cases before it
arose — New York, Tennessee, and California — fell into the innocent state
category.79 Yet the Court also stated that “[i]nnkeepers and public carriers, by the
laws of all the states, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their
facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in
good faith apply for them.”80  Making sense of this statement is difficult, not least
because whatever the face of state laws, their administration was decidedly unequal,
and addressing such discriminatory state administration was a main concern of the
1875 Act.81  The statement could be read, however, as a rejection of the claim that
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84 383 U.S. 301, 323-37 (1965).
85 See id. at 307-08.
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(discussing how South Carolina reached the Supreme Court and effect of the grant of original
jurisdiction on the Court’s analysis).
87 109 U.S. at 15-16. 
the laws specifically challenged in the case sanctioned discrimination in
accommodations, a reading that comports with the opinion’s next sentence, affirming
that “[i]f the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, . . . congress has full
power to afford a remedy under [the fourteenth] amendment and in accordance with
it.”82  In other words, this language suggests that the Court did not hold the 1875 act
facially invalid and it remained applicable in contexts of overt discrimination in state
laws.83
Similar ambiguities are evident in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, where the
Court upheld several challenged provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as valid
exercises of Congress’ Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.  Although the
Court referred to evidence relating to South Carolina, it plainly did not limit its
inquiry into the provisions’ constitutional application to that state.84  More
importantly, many of the challenged provisions applied only to certain jurisdictions
and applied identically to all the jurisdictions so covered, including South Carolina.
Thus, by deciding the constitutionality of the act as applied to South Carolina, the
Court necessarily also addressed its constitutionality vis-a-vis the other covered
jurisdictions.  Recognizing this, the Court invited other states to participate in the
case, and numerous states submitted amicus briefs and participated in oral
argument.85  The case thus was really akin to a class action, in that nearly all of those
to whom the statute applied were before the Court.  Moreover, it is hard to generalize
from the procedures used in South Carolina because it was a unique decision.  Given
the momentous nature of the question of the Voting Rights Acts’ constitutionality
and the need for a speedy decision, the Court took the case in its original jurisdiction,
but without even referring it to a special master for development of a factual record.86
Significantly, however, even where the Court appeared to analyze challenges
to enforcement legislation on a facial basis, it generally presumed that any
unconstitutional portions of the challenged legislation could be severed.  Noting that
it had previously upheld the fourth section of the 1875 act in Ex parte Virginia, the
Court in The Civil Rights Cases emphasized that the section there upheld was
“entirely corrective in its character,” and thus “differ[ed] widely from the first and
second sections of the same act which we are now considering.”87  By thus
reaffirming the constitutionality of the 1875 act’s fourth section the Court plainly
presumed that section could be severed from the other two sections the Court ruled
invalid.  In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court similarly severed parts of a statute it
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89 See 383 U.S. at 316-17.
90 See 362 U.S. 17, 23-25 (1960).
91 See 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 n.11 (2004).
92 Id. at 2005.
deemed outside of Congress’ powers rather than invalidating the statute in toto.88
And in South Carolina, the Court emphasized that it was not considering the
constitutionality of all of the 1965 Act’s provisions, specifically relying on Raines
in refusing to address the Act’s criminal provisions.89  While these are all instances
of text severability, in Raines the Court expressly refused to limit severability to that
context, instead holding that the district court had erred in considering the
constitutionality of statutory applications not actually before it.90
At a minimum, therefore, these earlier enforcement power decisions provide
some precedential support for adopting an as-applied approach in section five cases.
In Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to deny this support.  He argued that
because application of the statute to state officials in Raines was clearly
constitutional, that decision said nothing about how the Court should proceed when
the constitutionality of applying enforcement legislation to the state is at issue.91
This is unpersuasive, given that the Court upheld Title II’s constitutionality as
applied to state programs and services involving the right of access to the courts,
making Raines directly analogous.  The Chief Justice also suggested that Raines was
irrelevant because it was decided “before [the Court] enunciated the congruence-and-
proportionality test.”92  True, but this point simply presumes the answer to the very
question confronting the Court:  Does the congruence-and-proportionality test, a test
governing the substantive validity of section five legislation, also generate an
approach regarding facial challenges and severability different from that which
generally prevails? 
B. Commerce and Spending Clause Precedent 
Confusion regarding the appropriateness of facial challenges is also evident
in the Court’s decisions addressing attacks on Article I legislation as exceeding
Congress’ powers.  Interestingly, the Court’s commerce power decisions display far
more consistency than its enforcement powers decisions, with facial challenges being
regularly entertained.  Consistency is also apparent regarding spending clause
challenges, but here the pattern is for the Court to insist that challenges be brought
on an as-applied basis.  The obvious question that results is how to explain the
Court’s differential practice regarding these two forms of Article I challenges.
The Court’s willingness to entertain facial challenges holds true for both its
earlier and more recent commerce power decisions.  A classic example is United
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96 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) ;
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
97 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-(1936) (holding labor
provisions of Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 regulate production and fall outside of
the commerce power); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362-74
(1935) (invalidating required retirement and pension plan for employees of interstate carriers as
not a regulation of commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating statute
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98 In A.L.A. Schecter Poultry v. United States, for instance, the Court treated a commerce
clause challenge to the Live Poultry Code, adopted pursuant to section 3 of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, on an as-applied basis, emphasizing that the violations of the Code with which the
defendants had been charged did not involve interstate commerce.   See 295 U.S. 495, 542-48
(1935) (concluding that “so far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow of interstate
commerce had come to rest” and that the defendants’ violations of wages and hour provisions had
only an indirect affect on interstate commerce”); see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
States v. Carolene Products (most famous, of course, for its footnote four).   There,
the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting shipment of filled milk against a facial
challenge while noting that an as-applied challenge might lie: “[W]e recognize that
the constitutionality of a statute, valid on its face, may be assailed by proof of facts
tending to show that the statute as applied to a particular article is without support
in reason.”93  The Court’s acceptance of facial challenges was closely related to the
substantive standard it has applied in judging the constitutionality of commerce
power legislation in its post-New Deal decisions.  Demonstrating that a particular
activity did not itself affect interstate commerce was insufficient to show that it was
outside of Congress’ regulatory purview.  Instead, Congress’ power to regulate
economic conduct is measured on an aggregate basis: the key inquiry is whether the
class of activities of which a particular instance is part has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.94   This class of activities analysis — which remains the Court’s
approach today — virtually precludes a successful as-applied attack, unless the
challenger can demonstrate, as the Carolene Products Court put it, that “the article
[regulated], although within the prohibited class, is so different from others of the
class as to be without the reason for the prohibition.”95 
Judicial willingness to entertain facial challenges to commerce power
legislation was of no moment because of the deferential standard applied in assessing
such legislation’s constitutionality.96  No challenge, whether facial or as-applied, had
much chance of success.  When the Court applied a more rigorous and formalistic
analysis that limited Congress’ scope of power, as it did in its early New Deal
decisions, acceptance of facial challenges carried far more significance.  It is worth
noting, however, that the Court’s practice regarding facial challenges in this period
was more varied.  Some facial invalidations occurred,97 but in other decisions the
Court simply held the particular statutory applications in excess of the commerce
power..98  This variation seems best explained, however, as resulting from
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99 For example, part of the reason the Schecter Court treated the challenge on an as-
applied basis was that penalties were only imposed under the Act for violations of a code provision
regarding a transaction or affecting interstate commerce.  See 295 U.S. at 542.  The oddity of
Schecter is that the Court considered the as-applied commerce clause challenge at all given that it
had already held that the codemaking authority of section 3 represented an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, see id. at 541-42, which would appear to facially invalidate section
3.
100 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13, 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; see also
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 638-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing Lopez and Morrison as
embodying a new formalistic analysis akin to that used by the Court from the onset of national
commercial legislation in late 1880s to the early New Deal).
101 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
102 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
103 See Morrison, 514 U.S. at 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 519; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at
607 (“[W]e invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has
exceeded its constitutional bounds.”).
104 See 514 U.S. at 567.
differences in statutory text, with facial challenges being largely the norm.99  The
Court’s recent commerce power decisions, United States v. Lopez and United States
v. Morrison, suggest some return to a more formalistic analysis of the reach of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, insofar as the decisions insist
on a judicially-imposed distinction between economic and noneconomic activity.100
More to the point here, these decisions quite clearly continue the Court’s willingness
to entertain facial challenges to the constitutionality of commerce power legislation.
 Indeed, they provide the strongest contemporary support for the use of facial
challenges to invalidate federal statutes as exceeding congressional powers.
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(School Zones Act), which made knowing possession of a gun in a school zone a
federal offence, while Morrison addressed the constitutionality of the private civil
remedy provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).  In both
decisions, the Court focused on the nature of the class of activities being regulated
— gun possession near a school in Lopez, gender-motivated violence in Morrison101
— as well as other facial characteristics of the challenged legislation, specifically the
absence of a jurisdictional element that “would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce.”102  In both decisions, the
Court concluded that the challenged provisions could not be sustained under the
commerce power, indicating that they were invalid in toto, and thus not available
even when specific facts could be alleged demonstrating sufficient connection to
interstate commerce.103  The only reference to underlying facts in the two decisions
came at the end of Lopez, where the Court stated in passing that “[r]espondent was
a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in
interstate commerce.”104  While this language alone might suggest that conviction
under the School Zones Act could be sustained when the evidence in a particular
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case demonstrated an interstate commerce connection, such a reading ill accords with
the rest of the opinion’s emphasis on statutory text.105  
On the spending clause front, the Court’s approach is noticeably different, as
evidenced by the Court’s Sabri decision this Term.  Sabri involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of a federal statute criminalizing bribery of state, local, and tribal
officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds.  The defendant in
Sabri argued that the federal bribery statute was facially flawed because it did not
require proof of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe.  The
Court rejected this argument out-of-hand, stating that “[w]e simply do not presume
the unconstitutionality of federal criminal statutes lacking explicit provision of a
jurisdictional hook” and that $10,000 threshold meant no reason existed to suspect
the statute would extend beyond the scope of legitimate federal interests.106
Although the Court in fact entertained Sabri’s challenge, rejecting it rather
summarily on the merits, the Court used the decision as an occasion to disavow such
challenges to spending legislation.  According to the Court, Sabri’s facial challenge
was particularly inappropriate because “the acts charged against Sabri himself were
well within the limits of legitimate congressional concern,” meaning that any facial
challenge he brought would have to be of the overbreadth variety, attacking
application of the statute to others as unconstitutional.107  “Facial challenges of this
sort are especially to be discouraged” and limited to “relatively few settings.”108
Sabri is unusual in providing an express discussion of the appropriateness of
facial challenges, but it does not stand alone in discouraging such challenges in the
spending context.   In a prior decision, United States v. Salinas, the Court similarly
rejected a facial challenge to the bribery statute on the grounds that there was “no
serious doubt about [its] constitutionality . . . as applied to the facts of this case.”109
South Dakota v. Dole,110 where the Court set out its current standard for the
constitutionality of conditional federal spending legislation, is harder to categorize.
The decision appears proceed in largely general terms, without much reference to
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South Dakota’s particular situation.  But this seems explained by the fact that the
legislation treated all the states the same, so that no meaningful distinction could
exist between a facial and an as-applied challenge.  To be sure, the Supreme Court
has entertained and occasionally upheld facial challenges to spending clause
legislation.111  But as Sabri demonstrates, the current Court appears much less
receptive to such challenges in spending power cases than in commerce power cases.
Little objection was raised to Sabri’s express disavowal of facial overbreadth
challenges, and the mild comment made by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
Scalia, simply noted that the Court was not calling into question the approach
followed by the Court in Lopez and Morrison.112  Why this different receptivity
to facial challenges in the spending and commerce clause contexts?  The Court’s
sparse discussion in Sabri provides no clarification.  One answer might be that the
Court has not given much thought to the question and failed to recognize that its
practice regarding these two Article I powers and facial challenges is inconsistent.
However, given the majority’s discussion of the appropriateness of facial challenges
in Sabri combined with the concurrence’s distinction of Lopez and Morrison,
ignorance of the inconsistency seems implausible.  More likely, the Court’s lack of
explanation reflects the fact that it is more confident about its approach in the two
separate contexts than about how to reconcile the variation between them.
One way of trying to reconcile the decisions focuses on the fact that the
federal bribery statute at issue in Sabri and Salinas required proof of a threshold
amount of federal funds, thereby supplying the jurisdictional element that the Court
found lacking in Lopez and Morrison.  As a practical matter, the presence of the
threshold triggering amount may explain the Court’s greater willingness in Sabri and
Salinas to rely on case-by-case inquiry to guard against congressional overreaching;
it seems likely that Lopez especially would have come out differently had the School
Zones Act included a jurisdictional element.113  But this explanation cannot be easily
squared with what the Court actually says in these decisions, in particular Sabri’s
bald statement that “[w]e can readily dispose of th[e] position that, to qualify as a
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unconstitutional and analyzing restriction under unconstitutional conditions doctrine applicable to
restrictions on grants to private entities rather than under Dole).
valid exercise of Article I power, the statute must require proof of a connection with
federal money as an element of the offense.”114
An alternative explanation rests the difference on the greater breadth of the
spending power, the argument being that facial challenges in the spending context
make little sense unless the Court is going to impose meaningful limits on the scope
of congressional action.  As several scholars have noted, the Spending Clause
represents one of the few areas where the Court has not yet acted to curtail
congressional power out of federalism concerns.115  Instead, under Dole the real
protection against congressional overreaching in spending lies not in judicially-
imposed constraints but rather in the states’ ability to reject funds combined with
clear statement requirements.116  Lopez and Morrison, however, indicate that the
Court is willing to assert judicial limits on the commerce power.  They indicate that
certain activities lie outside of Congress’ commerce power —“the Constitution’s
enumeration of powers . . . presuppose[s] something not enumerated117 — whereas
the under the Hamiltonian view of the spending power, asserted by the Court in
United States v. Butler but only actually implemented in subsequent decisions,
“objectives not thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative fields may
nevertheless be attained through use of the spending power.”118  This explanation fits
contemporary case law, and it is hard not to read Sabri as signaling that the Court
remains reluctant to alter its current approach to the spending power.119   The
problem with this explanation is that it fails to account for the Court’s willingness
to entertain — albeit only to reject on the merits — facial challenges to commerce
power legislation in the post-New Deal period when it left the commerce power
essentially judicially unconstrained. 
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123 While the general welfare requirement might seem to impose a class of activities
restriction on the spending power, this requirement is essentially left for legislative determination. 
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976).
124 See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1946; Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-11.
125 In its early New Deal decisions, the Court at points seemed less willing to find
severability.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-16 (1936) (holding that price-
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Yet reference to the breadth of the spending power suggests a related and
more persuasive explanation:  that the difference in approach to facial challenges
reflects the difference in the substantive constitutional law applied in each context.120
In the commerce clause context, as noted the focus of analysis is usually on the class
of activities that Congress sought to regulate and on whether these activities are
economic or noneconomic in nature,121 a focus that almost always forces the Court
to adopt an analysis that goes beyond the facts of the case before it.122  But under the
Court’s spending clause analysis, Congress is not limited to a particular class of
activities; instead, restrictions are imposed on the manner in which Congress can
exercise its spending power.123  Moreover, given the loose relation to federal interests
and high financial penalties the Court accepted in Dole and Sabri,124 a state’s only
potentially viable option for arguing these restrictions are not met is an as-applied
challenge that bases claims of lack of connection to federal interests and coercion on
the state’s peculiar situation.  Spending power challenges are thus substantively ill-
suited to facial treatment. 
In any event, the Court’s differing receptivity to facial challenges should not
obscure a point of constancy in its recent commerce and spending power
jurisprudence:  in both, the Court appears to apply ordinary rules of severability.125
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The question of severability arose only in Morrison and then implicitly, when the
Court cited a separate criminal provision of the VAWA which contained a
jurisdictional element as an example of legislation that was sufficiently tied to
interstate commerce.126  Although not discussing the question, the Court’s comment
that the federal appellate courts had uniformly upheld this provision suggests that it
believed that the unconstitutional parts of VAWA could be severed and would not
force invalidation of the statute as a whole.127  Sabri’s argument against facial
challenges in spending power cases also carries with it the implication that any
unconstitutional applications of spending legislation could be severed, since
otherwise a successful as-applied challenge would be indistinguishable from a facial
overbreadth challenge.
C. The Meaning of Facial Challenges
The extent to which substantive law drives the shape of the Court’s analysis
in congressional power cases suggests the need for greater clarity regarding what
constitutes a facial challenge.  The distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges is more illusory than the ready familiarity of the terms suggests.  Indeed,
as Richard Fallon has argued, “facial challenges are less categorically distinct from
as-applied challenges than is commonly thought.”128  The nature of a “facial”
challenge is rarely explored in the case law; when a description is provided it
usually is only the unhelpful description that such a challenge targets a statute “on
its face.”129  Instead, facial and as-applied challenges are more commonly
differentiated by their effects.   A successful facial challenge means that the “state
may not enforce [a statute] under any circumstances, unless an appropriate court
narrows its application” to render it constitutional; a successful as-applied challenge
still allows the state to “enforce the statute in different circumstances.”130  In fact,
however, ordinary rules of preclusion and stare decisis make this contrast in effects
far less stark; the preclusive effect of a successful facial challenge will depend on the
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131 See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1336-41.
132 See  481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating that to make out a successful facial challenge “a
claimant must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists under which a statute can be
constitutionally applied”); United States v. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004) (describing facial
challenges “in the strictest sense” as ones where “no application of the statute could be
constitutional”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-06 (1985) (holding partial
invalidation rather than facial invalidation is appropriate where parties challenging statute seek to
engage in very speech that statute is overbroad for prohibiting and partial invalidation accords with
state law).
133 See Alfred Hill, Some Realism About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 Hofstra L.
Rev. 647, 648-52 (2001) (noting instances where the Court has invalidated part of a statute or
particular applications on facial challenge).
134 Paul M. Bator, et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System
662 (3rd ed. 1988);  see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993) (“[T]his is a facial
challenge. . . . Respondents do not challenge its application in a particular instance. . . . We have
only the regulation itself and the statement of basis and purpose that accompanied its promulgation
[before us.”); Adler, Rights Against Rules, supra note 21, at 157 n. 541 (describing facial
challenges as ones which focus exclusively on the predicate and history of a statutory rule, as
contrasted with as-applied “adjudication that depends, in part, on facts about the claimant”);
Monaghan, supra note 23, at 8 (“[A] challenge to the content of the rule applied is independent of
the specific facts of the litigant’s predicament.  Rather, it speaks to the relationship between the
facial content of the rule being applied to the facts and applicable constitutional law.”).
135 See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 139, at 662 (“Challenges to the validity of a statute
as applied to specific facts, on the other hand, turn necessarily on a determination of what the
adjudicative facts were . . . . [and] can always be rephrased simply as an assertion of federal right
or immunity with respect to the operative facts.” ); see also Monaghan, supra note 23, at 5.  While
as-applied challenges were thus viewed as largely the equivalent of claims of privilege, how such
challenges were stylized did affect the availability of review in the Supreme Court as of right; such
review was available only for as-applied challenges.  See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
level of court that issues the decision, and stare decisis means successful as-applied
challenges often generate results that are not specific to a particular challenger.131 
Despite the Court’s failure to clarify what it means a facial challenge, it is
possible to infer a definition from Salerno’s no valid application requirement.  This
requirement indicates that in the Court’s view a facial challenge must target a
statute’s constitutionality in all its applications, whereas as-applied challenges are
those that simply target the statute’s application in a particular context.132  Yet no
logical reason exists as to why a litigant could not make a partial facial challenge —
that is, allege that a particular statutory provision is unconstitutional or that a statute
is unconstitutional in a particular range of applications, even if not unconstitutional
in all or most.133  On this view, what differentiates facial and as-applied challenges
is not the breadth of the challenge, but the nature of the claim being asserted:  A
facial challenge is one that “puts into issue an explicit rule of law, as formulated by
the legislature or the court, and involves facts only insofar as it is necessary to
establish that the rule served as the basis of decision.”134 Notably, until Salerno
uprooted the traditional orthodoxy, facial challenges were understood to include such
context-specific challenges to general rules, because as-applied challenges were
defined in fairly narrow terms synonymous with claims of privilege.135  This narrow
approach is evident, for example, in Carolene Products.  The as-applied challenge
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136 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938).
137 See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948; Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960).  The same is true of
Katzenbach; although the Court there made references to discrimination against Puerto Ricans in
voting and provision of services, suggesting a traditional as applied challenge, given its references
to  to Puerto Ricans, it never demanded any showing that such discrimination actually existed in
New York.  384 U.S. 641, 652-55 (1966).
138 See Dorf, supra note 20, at 239-41; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
81-82 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government should be able to defeat a facial
challenge “by conjuring up a single valid application of the law” and providing such an example
based on the musical West Side Story)(emphasis omitted).
the Court leaves open there is really a fact-based claim of privilege or immunity —
that congressional regulation of a particular article or activity is not rational given
its specific characteristics — as opposed to a challenge to the general rule embodied
in the congressional regulation in question.136
Nothing in principle precludes defining facial challenges as operating at the
wholesale level and as-applied challenges as functioning on a more retail basis,
provided it is recognized that both target the constitutionality of a general rule.  But
the restrictive definition of facial challenges sows confusion, precisely because this
crucial proviso is often overlooked.  As the above examination of congressional
power cases reveals, substantive law may at times necessitate looking beyond the
facts of the case at hand.  This does not mean, however, that the Court must consider
all applications or dimensions of a statute to determine if Congress exceeded its
powers.  Rather, a range of challenges are possible, with Salerno-style facial
challenges and privileged-based as-applied challenges representing polar extremes
instead of mutually exclusive categories.  Take Lane as an example:  the Court there
considered whether Title II was as a means of enforcing the right of access to the
courts writ large, but it could alternatively have considered only the rights of access
of criminal defendants or court employees.  While the latter approach would be more
tied to the facts of Lane itself, the challenge would still be “facial,” in that the
contours of the claims at issue are not unique to the plaintiffs in the case.  Indeed,
despite its contemporary assignment to the as-applied camp, Raines actually
represents an instance where the Court entertained a facial challenge in this sense,
because the Court upheld the general rule laid down by Congress, namely a
prohibition on state officials depriving individuals of the right to vote based on
race.137 
Defining facial challenges in only Salerno terms is additionally confusing
because it hides the central role played by severability doctrine.  The claim that a
statute is unconstitutional in all its applications is usually quite implausible; a little
imagination suffices to produce at least one potentially constitutional application,
indeed even a fair number of constitutional applications.138  What underlies a
litigant’s claim that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied is therefore the
argument that the unconstitutional and constitutional aspects of a statute cannot be
severed.  As a result, viewing the issue in Lane as the availability of facial challenges
is misleading.  A litigant should be able to bring a facial challenge even of the
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139 Ordinary severability rules preclude bringing overbreadth challenges because the
assumption is that any unconstitutional applications could be severed, and thus actually resolving
the question of their constitutionality is not necessary to decide the case at hand.  See, e.g., Sabri,
124 U.S. at 1948 (arguing that facial overbreadth challenges are disfavored for this reason); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (“The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress
unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.”). 
140 Debate exists as to whether a special nonseverability presumption governs in First
Amendment cases.  Compare Monaghan, supra note 23, at 21-33 (arguing no nonseverability
presumption exists), with Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 25, at 867-74 (arguing Court applies a
nonseverability presumption and arguing that such a presumption protects First Amendment
values).
141 See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2009-10.
Salerno variety, alleging that a statute by its terms has inseparable unconstitutional
applications.  A court may respond by accepting the claim of unconstitutionality but
disagreeing about severability, with the result that the statute is then enjoined or
declared invalid in part to the extent it affects the plaintiff.  But the possibility of this
result at best justifies denying availability of a facial challenge in the first place only
where the litigant is not herself potentially subject to the unconstitutional application
and a presumption of severability applies.139 
 Or in other words, the real question raised by Lane is how the Court should
approach severability in the section five context: should it apply its ordinary
severability rules and presume unconstitutional applications are severable, or on the
contrary presume nonseverability?140  The Court’s congressional power precedent
seems to support applying ordinary severability rules, but the development of the
new congruence-and-proportionality test may mean the Court should change its
approach to facial challenges and severability in the section five context.  To the
extent the Court’s congressional power precedent involved other standards of review,
this prior practice is not determinative of how the Court should proceed today —
unless, of course, no reason exists to treat the congruence-and-proportionality test
differently.
II. FACIAL CHALLENGES, SEVERABILITY, AND THE 
CONGRUENCE-AND-PROPORTIONALITY TEST
What remains then is the pivotal normative inquiry:  Precedent aside, how
should the Court approach section five challenges?  More particularly, do substantive
concerns justify the Court in deviating from ordinary severability rules and treating
section five challenges as Salerno-style attacks requiring examination of all a section
five statute’s applications?
  One possible substantive argument against severability can be dismissed at
the outset.  The above discussion established that Congress’ power to act under
section five (and in other contexts) is assessed on a general basis; again, in Hibbs and
Lane, the Court relied on evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations in the
states generally as justifying application of section five legislation to specific states,
without inquiring into whether Nevada and Tennessee were guilty as well.141  As a
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result, it could be argued that challenges to legislation as exceeding such power
should be brought on a general basis as well.  Or in other words, these challenges
usually must look beyond the specific facts of the case at hand and thus be facial in
character.  This argument has some bite, as far as it goes.  But all it justifies is
judicial willingness to entertain facial challenges in the first instance, even if courts
quickly dispense with such challenges on the merits.  The general nature of
congressional power analysis provides no reason why a court, having found
application of a statute to be constitutional (or not), should deviate from applying
ordinary severability rules and presumptions in determining whether this application
is separable from the remainder of the statute.
Two additional arguments might be offered to justify such a deviation in the
section five context.  The first, focusing on the analytic requirements of the
congruence-and-proportionality test, contends that applying a presumption of
severability is at odds with the logic of that inquiry.  The second, focusing instead
on the values underlying the congruence-and-proportionality test and other
constitutional concerns, offers instrumental reasons to forego application of ordinary
severability rules.  These two lines of argument are taken up below in turn.
 
A. Severability and Congruence-and-Proportionality’s Substantive
Requirements
Determining whether severability is compatible with the substantive content
of the congruence-and-proportionality test entails returning to the discussion with
which this Essay began, namely what exactly does the congruence-and-
proportionality test mean?   The test could be seen as simply imposing a form of
heightened means-end scrutiny or narrow tailoring requirement.  Alternatively, it
could represent a form of illicit motive or purpose inquiry, which aims primarily at
identifying instances where Congress is using Fourteenth Amendment remediation
as a pretext for regulation.  Both of these understandings lie implicit in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s claim the logic of the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry requires
the Court to consider all of a section five statute’s applications:
In applying the congruence-and-proportionality test, we ask whether
Congress has attempted to statutorily redefine the constitutional
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This question can
only be answered by measuring the breadth of a statute’s coverage
against the scope of the constitutional rights it purports to enforce and
the record of violations it purports to remedy. 
. . . The effect [of the majority’s as-applied] approach is to rig
the congruence-and-proportionality test . . . . [T]he majority’s
approach is not really an assessment of whether Title II is
“appropriate legislation” at all, but a test of whether the Court can
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143 Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004) (quoting Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-728 (2003)); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US
507, 518 (1997)
144 On the degree of narrow tailoring congruence-and-proportionality requires, compare
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 959 (3rd ed. 2000) (describing review as
“something between intermediate and strict scrutiny”) with McConnell, supra note 15, at 166,
(standard akin to intermediate scrutiny), with  & Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at
477, 511 (test “seem[s] analogous to the narrow tailoring required for strict scrutiny”).
145 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 1132, 1153-58; McConnell, supra note 15, at 165-66.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
147 See Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1342, 1350-51; Dorf, supra note 20, at 251-
64, 281-82; Monaghan, supra note 23, at 17-18, 24-25.
conceive of a hypothetical statute narrowly tailored enough to
constitute valid prophylactic legislation.142
Although closely related, these two accounts of the congruence-and-proportionality
suggest different justifications for deviating from ordinary severability rules, and
thus will be discussed separately. 
1.  Congruence-and-Proportionality as a Narrow Tailoring Requirement.  As
it has emerged from recent decisions, with its emphasis on identifying an established
pattern of state constitutional violations to which Congress could legitimately
respond and on ensuring the means Congress chooses does not sweep too broadly,
the congruence-and-proportionality test appears as a form of narrow tailoring
analysis.  The Court’s continued willingness to grant Congress some wiggle room
— allowing Congress to “enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes
facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional
conduct”143 — suggests that the type of tailoring the test requires is more akin to
intermediate than strict scrutiny.144  The test does, however, require significantly
greater tailoring than ordinary rationality review, as the amount of legislation to fail
its strictures suggests.145
In several other narrow tailoring contexts, the Court deviates from the
ordinary presumption of severability and allows Salerno-style facial challenges —
statutes regulating abortion or restricting speech are the most acknowledged
examples.146  Such deviation may stem from prophylactic concerns, and thus be more
relevant to the instrumental concerns discussed below.  But it also in part reflects the
fact that given the narrow tailoring requirements mandated by substantive
constitutional law, a court is less likely to be able to fashion a legitimate construction
of the statute that allows it to conform to constitutional limits.  Moreover, as the
applicable standard of constitutional review is heightened, the likelihood increases
that a statute will be unconstitutional in a significant number of its applications, and
accordingly that attempts to sever these invalid applications will render the statute
non-functioning or excessively vague.147  Significantly, however, where the Court
is able to construe a statute to fit constitutional requirements, it frequently does so.
Thus, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court invalidated the husband-
notification and related notice requirement of Pennsylvania’s abortion law that it
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148 See 505 U.S. 833, 898, 901 (1992); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4, 11
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149 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983); see also United States v. National Treas. Emp’ees U.,
513 U.S. 454, 478 (1995) (enjoining application of broad honoraria ban for federal employees only
as applied to lower-level executive branch employees);  Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S.
491, 504-05 (1985) (refusing to facially invalidating state obscenity law but instead partially
invalidating provision insofar as it reached constitutionally protected activity); see also Virginia v.
American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (“It has long been a tenet of First
Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be readily susceptible to a
narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld.”); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 769 n. 24 (1982) (noting that faced with an overbreadth challenge, a federal court
“should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to
such a limiting construction” and in any event, “if it is severable, only the unconstitutional portion
is to be invalidated”).
150 530 U.S. at 944 (internal quotations omitted); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
884-85 (1997) (facially invalidating statutory provisions found unconstitutionally because
provisions were not readily susceptible to a saving construction).  Moreover, in Steinberg the
Court also held that absence of a health exception also rendered the statute constitutionally infirm,
so adopting a narrowing construction would not have led the Court to sustain it in any event.  See
530 U.S. at 946.
found unconstitutional and upheld the rest.148  Similarly, in United States v. Grace,
in response to a facial challenge to a federal prohibition federal prohibition on
“carrying signs, banners or devices” on the Supreme Court’s building and grounds,
the Court held the prohibition was unconstitutional “as applied” to “the public
sidewalks surrounding the building,” thus severing this application of the statute
from its other applications.149  
Moreover, when the Court enjoins the challenged statute in toto, it is not
because the Court rejects application of ordinary severability rules, but rather
because the Court holds that under those rules unconstitutional aspects of the statute
cannot legitimately be severed.  Thus, in  Steinberg v. Carhart, the Court concluded
that Nebraska’s statute banning “partial birth” abortions imposed an undue burden
on abortion because it covered dilation and evacuation, the most common and safest
method of previability abortions, as well as dilation and extraction, the method often
referred to as “partial birth” abortion.  Rather than imposing a narrowing
construction on the statute, or certifying the question of the statute’s meaning to the
state supreme court, the Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional.  But the
Court did not suggest that ordinary severability rules were inapplicable because the
statute was subject to heightened scrutiny.  Instead, it refused to sever the statute’s
unconstitutional applications or overbroad language on the grounds that doing so
would be at odds with the standard severability requirement that a narrowing
construction be “reasonable and readily apparent” on the face of the statute.150  To
take another recent example, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Court held Chicago’s
anti-loitering statute unconstitutional “on its face” for failing to provide citizens with
fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and for failing to contain adequate
guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement.  Narrowing was eschewed not because
the First Amendment was involved but because vagueness “permeate[d] the
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152 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997) (“[T]he gang loitering
ordinance is not reasonably susceptible to a limiting construction which would affirm its
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153 It also merits notice that the congruence-and-proportionality test differs from other
instances of narrow tailoring in that the test is aimed at identifying unconstitutional
overinclusiveness, not underinclusiveness.  The Court focuses on whether section five legislation
is excessive — either because no pattern of state constitutional violations exists, or because the
remedial means Congress chose sweeps too broadly.  Underinclusiveness appears only to be seen
as a virtue.  See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739-40 (using fact that Congress did not extend the
FMLA’s protections to high-ranking employees and in other ways limited the scope of FMLA
protections as evidence of the FMLA’s remedial character).  As a result, the Court’s willingness to
deviate from a presumption of severability in underinclusiveness challenges, see Dorf, supra note
20, at 251-61, would again not apply to justify such a deviation here.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 4-9.
155 124 S. Ct. 1978,1993 (2004).
ordinance.”151  In addition, Morales came to the Court from the Illinois Supreme
Court, which had not narrowed the ordinance’s scope and instead had held it facially
unconstitutional.152  As a result, the Supreme Court’s similar refusal to sever
accorded with the established rule that state court rulings on the meaning of state
statutes are binding on the Supreme Court.
This question of whether a state or federal statute is involved deserves
emphasis.  When the Court refuses to sever the unconstitutionally overbroad aspects
of a state statute, the state is still able to seek the needed curative construction from
its own courts.  But where federal statutes are involved, no such option exists; if the
Court refuses to sever, then the burden falls on Congress to amend the statute to fit
constitutional requirements.  Section five legislation is, of course, federal legislation,
and thus whatever willingness the Court displays to presume nonseverability in First
Amendment overbreadth challenges to state statutes does not necessarily carry
over.153 
This is not to say that the congruence-and-proportionality test imposes no
substantive limits on the extent to which a court can engage in severability.  The fact
that the test represents a form of narrow tailoring may justify deviating from the
presumption of severability to allow states to bring what are in essence facial
overbreadth challenges to the constitutionality of section five legislation.   More
importantly, as noted above, the recent section five decisions make the
constitutionality of section five legislation turn on the nature of the constitutional
right in question and on the presence of a pattern and history of states violating this
right.154  As a result, the congruence-and-proportionality test appears to preclude
considering the constitutionality of section five legislation only in the context of a
traditional as-applied challenge, where the court simply assesses whether a statute
can be applied to the particular facts before it.   Indeed, the majority in Lane
acknowledged this, assessing whether Title II was constitutional “as it applies to the
class of services implicating the accessibility of judicial services” in the states
generally, rather than limiting itself to considering whether Tennessee had violated
the plaintiffs’ particular rights of court access to the court.155  
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157 For accounts of the congruence-and-proportionality test as a purpose inquiry, see, e.g.,
J. Randy Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-Ends Relationships, 36 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 407, 432-46 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term —
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158 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1986 (2004); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729;
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
159 Smoking out illegitimate purpose is a prominent justification for use of strict scrutiny
in the equal protection context.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 509 U.S.306, 326 (2003) (“We
apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool.”) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
But these limitations are relatively minor, and narrow tailoring alone does not
justify the move of courts’ refusing to apply ordinary severability analysis in
responding to these challenges on the merits.  Lane, moreover, is really an instance
of the latter use of severability.  The Court did not avoid the constitutional challenge
asserted by Tennessee; instead, having found Title II constitutional in regard to
enforcing the right of access to the courts, it applied the presumption of severability
to avoid considering whether Title II was also constitutional in regard to other rights.
Or more precisely, Lane affirms the ability of states to bring challenges alleging that
section five legislation is unconstitutional on its face because insufficiently tailored
to remedying a constitutional violation.  All Lane rejects is the proposition that a
court, having found section five legislation to be constitutional (or unconstitutional)
in the context before it, must proceed to consider whether the legislation is
constitutional in all its applications.  In addition, although the Lane Court identified
the right at issue in general terms, i.e. as the right of access to the courts writ large,
nothing in congruence-and-proportionality appears to mandate such a generalized
definition.156  Thus a court could define the right in question on a more specific level,
i.e. as involving only criminal defendants’ rights of court access, and not reach the
constitutionality of the challenged statute’s application even to contexts involving
other dimensions of the right.
2.  Congruence-and-Proportionality as a Purpose Inquiry.  Another way of
understanding the congruence-and-proportionality test is as a purpose or motive
inquiry, because its underlying concern is to ensure that Congress does not use
section five as a pretext for imposing substantive regulations on the states that
otherwise would be outside of Congress’ powers.157  Support for understanding
congruence-and-proportionality as ultimately a purpose inquiry comes from the
Court’s consistent insistence that valid section five legislation must aim at
remedying, not redefining, Fourteenth Amendment violations.158  This view of the
test represents an additional spin on the narrow tailoring account more than a
separate interpretation:  the reason for imposing such scrutiny is to “smoke out”
illegitimate congressional intent.159
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160 Dorf, supra note 20, at 279; see also Fallon, As-Applied, supra note 20, at 1345 &
n.124 (same).  One instance where the Court does apply severability notwithstanding a finding of
unconstitutional purpose are the racial redistricting cases.  Districts drawn primarily on the basis of
race are unconstitutional, see, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995), but the Court does
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161 See Estreicher & Lemos, supra note 10, at 132-41 (describing congruence-and-
proportionality as applying only where congressional purpose is unclear and Court wants to give
Congress the benefit of the doubt); Beck, supra note 176, at 415-17, 432-36 (describing
congruence-and-proportionality and McCulloch v. Maryland as objective inquiries into pretext);
Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 459-60, 477, 510-11 (describing both Kimel and
Morrison as going beyond an investigation into whether Congress intended legislation to be
remedial and arguing the congruence-and-proportionality test is an “an odd and awkward way” to
identify “legislation enacted for the purpose of defining the substantive meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause”).
162 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728-37; Board. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-
  Viewing congruence-and-proportionality as a purpose inquiry might at first
glance indeed seem to justify deviating from ordinary severability rules.  According
to some commentators, claims of unconstitutional purpose are another instance
where the Court has allowed facial challenges, and more importantly responded by
refusing to sever unconstitutional applications.  Moreover, they argue that this
refusal is appropriate because “[i]f a statute serves an unconstitutional purpose, . . .
. [t]he unconstitutional purpose pervades all of the provision’s applications.”160  
It is important, however, to distinguish between two separate types of purpose
inquiries.  On the one hand, the Court might focus on discerning Congress’ actual
intent in enacting a section five statute.  On the other, it might focus on assessing
whether the statute objectively appears remedial, and presume that Congress’ actual
motivation was legitimate (or illegitimate) based on that assessment.  Viewing the
congruence-and-proportionality test as a purpose inquiry justifies deviating from
ordinary severability rules only under the subjective version; only if the Court
determines that Congress actually enacted the legislation out of nonremedial
concerns does it follow that the entire statute is tainted by illegitimate ends.  If
purpose is viewed in objective terms, however, little reason exists to deviate from
severability once the Court determines that some of a statute’s applications are
objectively remedial.  On the contrary, by cutting section five legislation down to
objectively remedial parameters the Court can protect states against congressional
overreaching while also deferring to what it has found to be plausible congressional
concerns regarding unconstitutional state actions.
The recent section five decisions are hard to square with an understanding of
congruence-and-proportionality as an inquiry into Congress’ actual motivation.161
The Court’s insistence on independently scrutinizing whether a pattern of state
constitutional violations existed and whether a section five measure is adequately
tied to remedying those violations is more in keeping with the objective account.162
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163 The congruence-and-proportionality test first appeared in Boerne in 1997.  RFRA,
there addressed, was enacted in 1993, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).  The
ADA was enacted in 1990, see Lane 124 S. Ct. at 1982; the FMLA in 1993, see Nevada Dept
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003); the VAWA in 1994, see United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000); the Plant Remedy Act in 1992, see Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Exp Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999), and the ADEA
was extended to the states in 1974, see Kimel v. Florida Dept of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000). 
164 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s repeated reference in Lane to the record before Congress as
well as his undertaking to independently assess that record suggests he takes such a view.  See
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1999-2003.
165 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S 100, 115 (1941).
166 See Hoke v. United States,  227 U.S. 308, 491-92 (1913);  Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321, 355-56 (1903). 
167 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609, 611 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558, 562 (1995).
168 In addition, while constitutional tests frequently include purpose inquiries, these often
take an objective form.  Rather than probing for evidence of unconstitutional subjective purpose,
for example, the Court often relies on the presence of facial classifications as justification for
applying heightened scrutiny, and a subjectively benign purpose does not suffice to lower the level
So too is the Court’s willingness to look at judicial evidence of state constitutional
violations not identified by Congress, and to apply the congruence-and-
proportionality test with full vigor to legislation enacted before Boerne.163  In the
latter case, a subjective inquiry would more sensibly focus on whether the legislation
appeared sufficiently remedial under then-existing standards.  
This leaves the possibility that the congruence-and-proportionality test has
both objective and subjective dimensions:  legislation must objectively appear
remedial and Congress must subjectively intend it as such.164  Such a dual account
better accords with the Court’s applications of congruence-and-proportionality,
insofar as the Court alternates between independently assessing section five
legislation and assessing the legislative record compiled by Congress.  But what
remains unexplained is why section five legislation must be both objectively and
subjectively legitimate to be constitutional.  In this regard, it worth noting that in the
commerce clause context, the Court has long ruled that Congress’ purpose is
irrelevant where Congress is clearly regulating interstate commerce.165  Even under
the Court’s pre-New Deal restrictive view of the commerce power, it held Congress’
motivation in enacting regulations to be irrelevant when Congress targeted interstate
commerce on the face of a statute.166   The emphasis on jurisdictional elements in
Lopez and Morrison, as well as their continued willingness to allow Congress broad
room to regulate economic activity (and reaffirmance of the constitutionality of
federal legislation motivated by non-commercial concerns, such as the Civil Rights
Act), indicate that the Court continues to adhere to this view.167  The Court plainly
believes that the difference in scope of Congress’s commerce and section five
powers necessitates more rigorous means-ends scrutiny of the latter.  But it has never
offered a justification for why legislation that in part satisfies this scrutiny should be
rendered entirely invalid on the basis of congressional subjective intent.168
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of scrutiny.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-29 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to racial classifications regardless of specific race targeted); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (applying strict
scrutiny to content-based speech regulation notwithstanding legitimate legislative motivation); see
also Fallon, Foreword, supra note 176, at 90-102.  On the use of purpose tests in constitutional
analysis, see generally Ashutosh Bhagwat. Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 Cal. L.
Rev. 297 (1997).
169 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 2, at 1168-86; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court,
2000 Term — Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 136-53 (2001); McConnell, supra
note 15, at 181-92; Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 1966-71, 1980-
84.
170 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. (5 U.S.) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Nevada Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“It falls to this Court, not Congress, to define
the substance of constitutional guarantees.”); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997) (“when the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the
Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.  Marbury v. Madison.”).
171 See Kramer, supra note 189, at 13 (distinguishing between judicial supremacy and
judicial sovereignty on similar grounds).  Robert Post and Reva Siegel have suggested that on the
contrary, it is the Court’s independent inquiry into whether section five legislation is remedial, and
not its investigation into whether Congress’ subjective purpose, that represents the greatest
intrusion on congressional power.  See Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 2, at 459-62,
511.  This might follow if the subjective inquiry was limited to whether Congress intended its
legislation to be remedial, given its own understanding of the rights involved.  But given the
Court’s insistence that Congress lacks power to deviate substantively from judicial
pronouncements regarding the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights, any subjective inquiry
would appear to be an investigation into whether Congress intended its legislation to remedy
violations of such rights as judicially defined.  Indeed, a subjective inquiry would appear to
preclude precisely the kind of policentric constitutional interpretation they advocate, as they
appear to acknowledge.  See Post & Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism, supra note 6, at 2023;
see also id., at 2020-45 (setting out policentric model).
Most importantly, viewing the congruence-and-proportionality test as
entailing, even in part, an assessment of Congress’ actual intent has significant
ramifications for Congress’ institutional independence.  Some have criticized the
recent section five decisions as judicial power grabs, arguing that the Court is
illegitimately arrogating to itself the power to determine the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.169  The Court has responded by maintaining that it is simply
adhering to Marbury v. Madison’s insistence that the judicial role is to say what the
law is.170  If congruence-and-proportionality is viewed in subjective terms, then the
Court is going substantially beyond simply asserting the power to ensure that section
five legislation confirms to judicial understandings of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Instead, the Court in essence would be requiring Congress to adhere to these judicial
understandings in its deliberations or risk having its enactments invalidated — even
if, objectively assessed, these enactments do not add to the scope of judicially
established Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Such a move represents an extraordinary
degree of judicial control of Congress’ exercise of its enumerated powers.171 
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172 See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004).
173 See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (describing First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine as resting on “concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law
may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech” because “[m]any persons, rather than
undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-
by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from speech.”); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.
576, 581 (1989) (same); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L. J. 853,
867-75, 884-89 (1991) (describing chill and legislative incentive arguments); see also Monaghan,
supra note 23, at 31-33 (describing the incentive argument for overbreadth regarding federal
statutes but concluding it fails to justify nonseverability).  For an initial and influential academic
analysis of the chill argument for overbreadth, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 852-58, 865-82 (1970).
174 See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2005-06.
B. Instrumental Arguments Against Severability under the Congruence-
and-Proportionality Test
In addition to arguments from precedent and the substantive content of
congruence-and-proportionality, the Chief  Justice also offered instrumental reasons
for denying severability.   He maintained that assessing the constitutionality of
section five legislation on an as-applied basis “eliminates any incentive for Congress
to craft [section five] legislation for the purpose of remedying or deterring actual
constitutional violations.”  Instead, it will fall to the courts “to sort out which
hypothetical applications of an undifferentiated statute . . . may be enforced,” with
the result that “States will be subject to substantial litigation in a piecemeal attempt
to vindicate their Eleventh Amendment rights.”172  These claims parallel the standard
instrumental arguments for facial challenges and nonseverability in First Amendment
overbreadth cases, specifically that requiring individuals to challenge overbroad
statutes on a case-by-case basis risks “chilling” exercise of First Amendment rights
and undermines legislative incentives to draft statutes that take First Amendment
concerns seriously.173  To these two instrumental arguments could be added a third,
also raised by the Chief Justice:  allowing severability in the section five context
imposes significant burdens on the federal courts and thus deviates from “the proper
role of the Judiciary.”174  But as was true regarding the substantive claims discussed
above, none of these arguments suffices to justify deviating from ordinary
severability rules. 
1.  Nonseverability and Deterrence of States Asserting Their Constitutional
Rights.  Undoubtedly, an as-applied approach to section five challenges, under which
the Court only considers the constitutionality of legislation in regard to the case at
hand and severs other applications, will lead to “piecemeal” litigation.  States will
not be able to procure a determinative assessment of a section five statute’s
constitutionality in a single proceeding.  But this is true whenever a court denies a
facial challenge or severs applications of a statute not directly before it.  In fact, in
its justifications for limiting the availability of facial challenges, the Court usually
describes forcing constitutional litigation to proceed in a “piecemeal” fashion as a
virtue, not a vice.  
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175 The cases that do not involve states as parties are those where section five legislation
targets private action, a category rendered perhaps a null set by United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 620-26 (2000), and those where the legislation authorizes actions against individual state
officials, see, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960).
176 See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of the State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 1999-2009 (2001) (detailing
substantial increase in state attorney general cooperation and multistate litigation since 1980);
Steven Andersen, Power of the States: The Rise of the State Attorneys General, Corp. Litig. Times,
Aug. 2003 (describing rise in activity and power of state attorney generals); David Bank, States to
Investigate Oracle Bid; Attorneys General Agree to Cooperate, Share Costs to Review PeopleSoft
Offer, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 2003, at A2 (noting attorneys general from 30 states formally agreed to
cooperate in antitrust investigation).
177 See Carroll, supra note 34, at 1061-62 (similarly arguing states will not be deterred
from asserting their rights).  Moreover, several scholars have questioned the empirical basis for the
chill argument even in regard to the First Amendment, given that citizens are unlikely to be
sufficiently aware of how a statute is written to be chilled from engaging in expressive activities,
and even less likely to be aware of curative constructions claimed to reduce such chilling effect. 
See Fallon, Making Sense, supra note 180, at 885-88 (describing and responding to criticisms of
chill justification for First Amendment overbreadth doctrine).
The question therefore is whether something unique to the section five
context renders concerns about piecemeal proceedings more salient.  One
distinguishing feature of section five litigation is that it overwhelmingly involves a
State as a party, and does so universally when the underlying issue is whether a
congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is constitutional.175
Moreover, in ordinary overbreadth challenges, the litigant wants to attack application
of a statute to a hypothetical third-party, making it speculative whether such an
application will occur.  But in the section five context, it is plausible to expect that
a State attacking other applications of a statute will itself be subject to those
applications, so the as-applied approach not only forces piecemeal assessment of a
statute’s constitutionality, but also piecemeal assessment of a particular party’s
rights.
On the other hand, states are better positioned than most to handle such
repeated litigation.  While defending challenges takes resources, states have attorney
general offices and staffs already in place to handle litigation on their behalf.
Increasingly state attorney generals are collaborating on section five challenges and
other litigation, lessening the resource burden.176  Moreover, states often have a
financial incentive to litigate section five challenges, because success on such
challenges serves to remove their liability for money damages in private suits.  And
states do not face criminal penalties for engaging in conduct prohibited by section
five legislation.  These latter two features in particular serve to distinguish section
five and First Amendment challenges and make claims of chill much harder to justify
in regard to the former.177
This leaves the claim that federalism values should make the Court especially
solicitous of imposing litigation burdens on states.  The states’ distinctive role in the
constitutional order might seem to justify distinctive treatment in the form of denying
severability when congressional legislation is challenged as treading on their
constitutional prerogatives.  But if so, then severability should also be denied
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178 See 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985).
179 Numerous states, for example, signed onto amicus briefs in Lane and Hibbs arguing
that the statutes challenged in those cases were constitutional, at least in some applications.  See
Brief of Minnesota  et al as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Tennessee v. Lane,  124 S.
Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-1667), 2003 WL 22733906, at *1 (arguing that Title II is constitutional in
all its application and noting “[a]lthough the states more typically advocate the application of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, this case is different. . . .The states should support every effort to
eradicate the effects of the documented long-term, pervasive and invidious discrimination against
people with disabilities in the provision of public services.”); Brief of Kansas and Delaware as
Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-
1667), 2003 WL 22733907 at 1(arguing Title II constitutional as applied to pursuit and
enforcement of fundamental due process rights); Brief of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in
support of Respondents, Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2002
WL 31427565 at 1 (“[A]llowing our citizens to enforce their FMLA rights without restriction is
consistent with the obligation of attorneys general of the amici curiae States to protect the public
interest by ensuring that workplace gender discrimination against our citizens, with all of its
vestiges, is eliminated.); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 661-62 (2000) (noting
that an “overwhelming majority of States (38) supported” the VAWA).   Other states argued that
Title II of the ADA and the FMLA were unconstitutional.  See Brief of Alabama et al as Amici
Curiae in support of Petitioners, Tennessee v. Lane,  124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-1667), 2003
WL 22176110; Brief of Alabama  et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioners, Nevada Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 1974391.
whenever states challenge congressional legislation, and perhaps whenever
congressional legislation is challenged as violating state autonomy or intruding into
the states’ proper sphere.  Yet the rejection of facial challenges in the spending
clause context announced in Sabri, as well as the rejection of judicial protection
against direct federal regulation of the states announced in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro Transit,178 indicate that such special solicitude for the “states as states” does
not apply across the board.  Moreover, recognition of the distinctive position of the
states might instead counsel for the Court limiting itself to considering the
constitutionality of section five statutes only as implicated by the case before it, as
a state may prefer to take a more discriminating approach and not challenge all of the
statutes’ applications.179
At a minimum, the claim that federalism values mandate application of a
special nonseverability rule in the section five context must be expressly stated and
justified, something the Court has yet to do.  Such a defense is all the more necessary
given that the Court cannot grant the states special status here without
simultaneously disregarding the distinctive position of Congress.  Denying
severability means denying Congress the right to have its statutes remain in force
insofar as they fall within its enumerated powers.  Again, this goes beyond the
Court’s insisting that its determinations of the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment
rights set the contours of Congress’ enforcement power; instead, the Court would be
refusing to uphold section five legislation, even to the extent such legislation
conformed to such judicial determinations, if the statutes also had applications that
went beyond.  Simply invoking the respect due states is therefore inadequate to deny
severability unless some reason exists why respect for the states should so
significantly trump respect for Congress in this context.
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180 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996); compare Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding due process “prohibit[s] a State from denying, solely because of
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages”) with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-46 (1973) (holding due process does not
require waiving fees in bankruptcy proceeding) and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660-61
(1973) (holding due process does not require waiving fee to obtain review of welfare benefits
termination).
181 See supra note 15.
182 See supra note 169.
183 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
184 See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003)
(same); id. at 756 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2010-12 (Scalia, J.,
2.  Nonseverability and Congressional Incentives.  The incentive argument
might appear at first glance to justify prioritizing respect for the states over Congress.
On this argument, the reason to prioritize protecting the states is that Congress is in
a position to protect its own interests by framing its legislation with greater care; the
states, however, have no resort but the courts.  Denying severability gives Congress
a needed incentive to take constitutional limits on its section five powers seriously;
otherwise, as the Chief Justice maintained, Congress will just rely on the courts to
do its work.
But reliance on the courts to ensure section five legislation fits constitutional
limits cannot be facilely dismissed as congressional irresponsibility.  To begin with,
the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights is not always so clear.  For instance, the
Court has vacillated tremendously in setting out the constitutional right of access to
the courts, even acknowledging dispute as to whether the substantive basis of the
right rests in equal protection or due process.180 As a result, Congress in good faith
may not be able to discern clearly the bounds of its section five authority.  In
addition, the Court sometimes invokes one standard but in practice appears to apply
another, suggesting greater constitutional protection than it may be willing to overtly
acknowledge.   Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne’s rigorous use of
supposed rationality review in addressing equal protection claims brought by the
disabled is a prime example.181  It seems unfair to penalize Congress for not guessing
correctly that the Court meant the standard it formally evoked, not the standard
actually applied.  And of course, the Court’s recent section five decisions all
involved statutes enacted before the Court adopted the congruence-and-
proportionality test and at a time when the Court was instead far more deferential in
its review of section legislation.182  That these statutes do not hew to the test’s
requirements is hardly Congress’ fault.
The most serious flaw in the incentive argument, however, is that the effect
of denying nonseverability would be to unduly narrow Congress’ section five power.
According to the Court, Congress has some room to maneuver and has the power to
prohibit some state conduct that is not unconstitutional:  “Legislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional.”183  Indeed, all but Justice Scalia agree that Congress’ section five
power has some prophylactic scope.184  Accepting arguendo the logic of the
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dissenting) (arguing that section five “does not authorize . . . so-called prophylactic measures” but
accepting such measures where aim is to remedy racial discrimination).
185 The incentive argument assumes that members of Congress are more concerned with
ensuring the legislation they enact withstands judicial challenge then with the political benefits
gained simply by enacting legislation that their constituents or interest groups desire.  This seems a
highly dubious assumption, see, e.g., Neal Devins, Lee Epstein;  contra Fallon, Making Sense,
supra note 180, at 888-89 & n. 221, thus raising an additional reason to reject this argument for
nonseverability.
186 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 1134-41, 1186-96; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 218 (2003) (refusing to apply the congruence-and-proportionality test outside of the
section five context).
incentive argument,185 it follows that this room only realistically exists if the Court
is willing to sever congressional excesses.  Otherwise, the risk of total invalidation
may well lead Congress to err on the side of caution and stick closely to prohibiting
only clearly unconstitutional conduct.   Or to put the point differently, the effect of
nonseverability is to unjustifiably chill Congress in exercising the full scope of its
section five power.
3.  Judicial Manageability and Judicial Role.  This leaves the final
instrumental justification for nonseverability, namely that addressing challenged
section five legislation on a case-by-case basis will prove burdensome for the courts
and puts them improperly in the position of rewriting congressional legislation.  This
argument carries particularly little weight.  First, ordinary severability rules already
adequately address the judicial role concern; under these rules, severability is
inappropriate unless it represents a “fair and reasonable” interpretation of a statute
rather than a rewriting of statutory text.  Similarly, the ordinary presumption of
severability indicates that the judicial efficiency gains of assessing a statute’s
constitutionality in a single proceeding do not on their own outweigh the institutional
concerns counseling for a case-by-case approach.
But in addition, the judicial manageability problems the Court may face in
having to determine the constitutionality of section five legislation on an as-applied
basis are directly the result of the substantive standard the Court has imposed in this
context.  Given that the scope of Congress’ power turns on the judicial scrutiny
triggered by the underlying constitutional right, it is inevitable that the same statute
may be constitutional as applied to protect one constitutional right and
unconstitutional in regard to another.  Having thus created the situation where
application-specific assessments are necessary to determine if challenged legislation
is constitutional, the Court cannot complain about the resultant burdens on the courts.
C. Other Congressional Power Contexts
This leaves the question of whether deviation from ordinary severability rules
is appropriate in other congressional power contexts.  The greater rigor of the
congruence-and-proportionality test compared to Article I analysis, which applies a
far more deferential review even when federalism concerns are at stake,186 makes the
claim for federalism-based nonseverability outside of section five a particularly
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see also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-66 (1962) (holding indictment must contain
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prepared to meet”) (internal quotations omitted).
doubtful proposition.  Notably, when the Court has employed a more restrictive
analysis in reviewing Article I legislation, such as the anti-commandeering rule, it
still responds to finding unconstitutionality by severing the offending provisions.187
What then to make of Lopez and Morrison?  Again, the absence of any
express discussion of facial challenges or severability in these decisions cautions
against reading too much into their text.  But their seeming refusal to sever
potentially constitutional applications of the statutes therein challenged and resort
to total invalidation is striking.  Again, justifying this result on a distinction between
text and application severability is implausible; not only does the Court not generally
distinguish analytically between these two forms of severability, but also its avowed
lack of concern with actual intent in the commerce clause context removes illicit
subjective motive as a reason for drawing such a distinction.188   
The best response thus seems that Lopez and Morrison are in error, insofar
as their mode of analysis deviates from ordinary severability doctrine.  But the
Court’s refusal to sever unconstitutional applications in these decisions may be
explicable on other grounds.  In Lopez, due process arguably prevents a defendant
from being convicted for violating a statute where the class of activities being
regulated lies generally outside of Congress’ power and the government failed to
allege and prove some interstate commerce connection in the particular case.189  And
one way of making sense of Morrison is to view the Court as concluding (perhaps
implausibly) that interposing an interstate commerce element into VAWA’s civil
remedy provision would stray over the line from judicial narrowing to judicial
rewriting of a challenged statute.  Congress did include such an element in the act’s
criminal enforcement provision, suggesting that its absence in the civil remedy
provision was intentional.
CONCLUSION
The majority in Lane seems to have gotten it largely right.  True, the opinion
gives too little explanation of how facial and as-applied challenges actually differ
and of where its approach falls on the range of facial and as-applied analysis.  But
the majority was correct on the critical issue:  No reason exists, whether based in
precedent, the substantive content of the congruence-an-proportionality test, or
instrumental concerns, to deviate from the ordinary severability rules and the
presumption of severability in the section five context.  States should be able to bring
facial challenges to section five statutes — that is, challenges which attack the
general rule and requirements set forth in such legislation, as opposed to challenges
that focus on the facts of the controversy in the case before the court.  But once a
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192 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 460-61 (1992).
court determines that the statute is constitutional in regard to enforcing the
constitutional right at issue in the case at hand, the proper course is for it is generally
to uphold this application of the statute and not proceed to consider other
applications.  The converse is also true: if a court holds the statute to exceed
Congress’ power in regard to the right at issue, it should enjoin the legislation only
as so applied, leaving open whether the statute would be constitutional in other
contexts.  While instances may exist where a statute has only one type of application,
examination of the Court’s section five cases makes clear such occasions are likely
rare.  
The one qualifier is that under the ordinary rules of severability, a court
should only sever section five legislation in this fashion if it determines that the
statutes are readily susceptible to such a construction.  Where the Lane majority
erred was in never engaging in such an inquiry and instead simply relying on a tacit
presumption of severability (although that is often the Court’s standard practice).
Moreover, satisfying severability analysis can be a significant hurdle.  At a
minimum, severability case law demonstrates that the Court has varied in its
willingness to read statutes as supporting curative constructions.190
Thus, a final question is whether denying the propriety of facial challenges
and a nonseverability principle in the section five context will make much difference,
given that the Court can reach the same result through express application of
severability analysis.  The answer is yes.  No doubt, the same separation of powers
and federalism concerns identified by many as animating the Court’s recent section
five decisions would lead it to take a stingy approach to severability in some cases,
and conclude that severing potentially unconstitutional applications would represent
illegitimate judicial rewriting of a congressional statute.  Critically, however, control
over severability lies largely with Congress.191  Provided it makes its intent clear that
not just unconstitutional provisions but unconstitutional applications are to be
deemed severable,192 the Court’s ability to nonetheless facially invalidate section five
legislation will be significantly curtailed.
